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Scienter Pleading and Rule 10b-5:  
Empirical Analysis and  
Behavioral Implications 
Dain C. Donelson † & Robert A. Prentice ‡ 
Abstract 
Pleading requirements are the keys to the courthouse. Nowhere is 
this more true than with rule 10b-5 class action securities fraud claims. 
Provisions of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 
impose special pleading burdens upon plaintiffs regarding the scienter 
element and bar them from discovery when defendants file a motion to 
dismiss. This Article begins with a doctrinal history of the scienter 
element of a rule 10b-5 claim that indicates that many key legal 
questions remain unsettled and that application of legal rules to specific 
factual allegations regarding a particular type of defendant—external 
auditors—is extraordinarily muddled. To determine whether the 
impression arising from this extensive but nonsystematic examination 
of the case law is accurate, we also empirically examine rule 10b-5 
claims against auditors and confirm that few facts are consistently 
viewed by the courts as indicating the presence (or absence) of scienter. 
This lack of clarity in the law and its application makes it difficult for 
either plaintiffs or defendants to evaluate the settlement value of 
claims. Furthermore, the law’s excessive vagueness affords judges 
virtually untrammeled discretion. The literature of behavioral psychology 
and related fields indicates that excessive discretion exacerbates problems 
that arise from unconscious judicial bias. 
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Introduction 
Many important and contentious issues surround private class 
action securities fraud lawsuits under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 of 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.1 Pleading requirements “are the 
key that opens access to courts”2 for these and other lawsuits, yet the 
law in this area has long been and continues to be best described as 
“muddled.”3 The confused state of the law is more than just theo-
retically important because empirical studies of differential pleading 
standards among the circuits in rule 10b-5 cases indicate that certain of 
these differences strongly affect both dismissal rates4 and the types of 
 
1. This Article takes no position on the question of whether such lawsuits 
are generally good or bad. Certainly, many believe they are damaging to 
the economy and serve no good end. See, e.g., Evaluating S. 1551: The 
Liability for Aiding and Abetting Securities Violations Act of 2009: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime & Drugs of the S. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 216–22 (2009) (statement of Adam C. 
Pritchard, Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School) (arguing 
that private class actions move a lot of money around, but add little to 
deterrence at the margin); Roberta Romano, The Shareholder Suit: 
Litigation Without Foundation?, 7 J.L. Econ. & Org. 55, 84 (1991) 
(arguing that attorneys are the principal beneficiaries of this litigation). 
Others have found evidence of benefits flowing from active private 
antifraud litigation. See, e.g., Frank B. Cross & Robert A. Prentice, 
Law and Corporate Finance 182 (2007) (reporting results of 
empirical study finding, among other things, that “in the securities law 
enforcement context, it is the private right of action and not government 
prosecution which has the greatest financial value”); Howell E. Jackson & 
Mark J. Roe, Public and Private Enforcement of Securities Laws: 
Resource-Based Evidence, 93 J. Fin. Econ. 207, 237 (2009) (finding that 
key positive financial outcomes such as stock market capitalization, 
trading volumes, and number of IPOs correlate with private 
enforcement—but also with public enforcement—of securities laws); Rafael 
La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, What Works in 
Securities Laws?, 61 J. Fin. 1, 27–28 (2006) (finding various benefits 
flowing from active private enforcement of public securities laws); Justin 
Hopkins, Does Shareholder Litigation Affect Financial Reporting Choices? 
4–5 (Apr. 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=1872068 (finding that a court decision that reduced the risk of 
shareholder litigation led to more financial restatements and earnings 
management, especially among firms facing a higher risk of litigation). 
2. Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 230 (3d Cir. 2008).  
3. Ann Morales Olazábal & Patricia Sanchez Abril, The Ubiquity of Greed: 
A Contextual Model for Analysis of Scienter, 60 Fla. L. Rev. 401, 412 
(2008) (noting the “muddled quality of the jurisprudence in this area”). 
4. See Michael A. Perino, Did the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act 
Work?, 2003 U. Ill. L. Rev. 913, 937, 976 (finding that the Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act affected dismissal rates, and that the 
stringency of the pleading standard applied by a particular circuit was 
especially impactful); A.C. Pritchard & Hillary A. Sale, What Counts as 
Fraud? An Empirical Study of Motions to Dismiss Under the Private 
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cases that are filed, effectively screening out cases with smaller claim 
amounts.5 
Similar confusion reigns in an important strand of these cases that 
is the primary focus of this Article—those section 10(b)/rule 10b-5 
claims brought against external auditors. Pervasive confusion is not 
terribly unusual in the case law generated by federal securities litigation,6 
but neither is it a good thing. A doctrinal analysis of courts’ scienter 
decisions in these rule 10b-5 auditor cases highlights the existence of 
these many important and contentious issues but does little to resolve 
them. A primary purpose of this Article is to determine whether or 
not empirical analysis can shed some light on these issues and, if so, 
help to clarify the pragmatic contours of the all-important scienter 
requirement in private federal securities fraud litigation. 
In a narrow but important area, this Article addresses two of the 
most important balancing acts in the law. How can plaintiffs be granted 
adequate access to the courthouse without unduly burdening defend-
ants with frivolous litigation? And how can judges be allowed adequate 
discretion to dispose quickly of unpromising claims without giving them 
untrammeled discretion to advance their own unconscious biases? 
Part I of this Article undertakes a traditional historical and 
doctrinal analysis of the statutory and case-based development of the 
law of scienter in rule 10b-5 litigation. It provides background and 
context, addressing the scienter issue generally, but also focusing on 
the case law involving auditor defendants specifically. Part II reports 
the methods and results of an empirical analysis of the scienter-
related case law in rule 10b-5 litigation against external auditors. 
Both the doctrinal and the empirical analyses indicate that the law of 
pleading scienter against external auditors in rule 10b-5 cases is so 
vague and inconsistent that, as a practical matter, judges have virtually 
unfettered discretion to reach any conclusion they deem appropriate. 
Using the insights of behavioral psychology and related fields, Part III 
analyzes the unfortunate implications of such nearly limitless discretion. 
 
Securities Litigation Reform Act, 2 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 125, 
142 (2005) (finding that different pleading standards among circuits 
affected motion to dismiss outcomes). 
5. Perino, supra note 4, at 916–17 (noting that stricter pleading standards 
may cause plaintiffs’ attorneys to focus on cases with higher damages).  
6. See, e.g., Stefan J. Padfield, Immaterial Lies: Condoning Deceit in the 
Name of Securities Regulation, 61 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 143, 179 
(2010) (noting “unnecessary confusion about the definition of 
materiality”); Ferry Eden Lopez, Comment, At a Loss with Loss 
Causation: Resolving the Ninth Circuit’s Loss Causation Decisions in 
Metzler Investment GMBH v. Corinthian Colleges and In re Gilead 
Sciences, 43 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1737, 1743 n.24 (2010) (noting 
evidence of confusion over what constitutes loss causation, even after 
latest Supreme Court case on the issue).  
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I. A History of the Scienter Requirement,  
Especially as Regards Auditor Defendants 
A. The Early Questions 
1. Is section 10(b) a scienter-based or negligence-based statute? 
Section 10(b)7 forbids securities fraud in violation of SEC rules, 
such as rule 10b-5.8 The role of scienter in rule 10b-5 cases has been 
filled with controversial questions over the years and remains so. The 
initial question was whether Section 10(b) is a scienter-based or 
negligence-based statute. Some lower courts initially held that 
negligence alone could violate the statute,9 while other courts strongly 
 
7. Section 10(b) reads, in pertinent part: 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the 
use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of 
the mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange— 
. . . . 
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of 
any security registered on a national securities exchange or 
any security not so registered, or any securities-based swap 
agreement . . . , any manipulative or deceptive device or 
contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as 
the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in 
the public interest or for the protection of investors. 
15 U.S.C. § 78j (2006). 
8. Rule 10b-5 reads: 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the 
use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or 
of the mails or of any facility of any national securities 
exchange, 
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, 
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit 
to state a material fact necessary in order to make the 
statements made, in the light of the circumstances under 
which they were made, not misleading, or 
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which 
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any 
person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any 
security. 
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2012). 
9. See, e.g., Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634, 637 (7th Cir. 1963) 
(“[T]he statute was meant to cover more than deliberately and 
dishonestly misrepresenting or omitting material facts . . . .”); Ellis v. 
Carter, 291 F.2d 270, 274 (9th Cir. 1961) (disagreeing with the assertion 
that the plaintiff must prove “genuine fraud” instead of “a mere 
misstatement or omission”).  
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disagreed.10 That issue, at least (and, perhaps, at most) is now firmly 
settled. In 1976, the Supreme Court established in Ernst & Ernst v. 
Hochfelder that section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 are intent-based liability 
provisions.11 
2. Is recklessness sufficient to satisfy the scienter standard? 
Hochfelder left open an immediate, critical question that remains 
unsettled nearly forty years later.12 The Supreme Court has at least 
thrice reserved without deciding the issue of whether recklessness 
suffices to satisfy the scienter standard.13  
If the Supreme Court ever rules on this issue, it should embrace 
the recklessness standard for at least three reasons. First, for more 
than three decades the lower courts have been virtually unanimous in 
holding that recklessness suffices.14 Second, the common law of fraud 
has long recognized recklessness as sufficient to satisfy the scienter 
 
10. See, e.g., Clegg v. Conk, 507 F.2d 1351, 1362 (10th Cir. 1974) (requiring 
more than “simple negligence not involving some fraudulent purpose or 
species of scienter”); Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1306 (2d 
Cir. 1973) (“[P]roof of a willful or reckless disregard for the truth is 
necessary to establish liability under Rule 10b-5.”). 
11. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976). Relying upon 
legislative history and principles of statutory interpretation, the Court 
concluded in Hochfelder, a case involving an auditor defendant, that 
“[w]hen a statute speaks so specifically in terms of manipulation and 
deception, and of implementing devices and contrivances—the commonly 
understood terminology of intentional wrongdoing—and when its history 
reflects no more expansive intent, we are quite unwilling to extend the 
scope of the statute to negligent conduct.” Id. at 214.  
12. Hochfelder also left unsettled the question of whether the scienter 
requirement applied in SEC actions as well. The Supreme Court quickly 
held that it did. Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 701–02 (1980) (“[T]he 
Commission is required to establish scienter as an element of a civil 
enforcement action to enjoin violations of [section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5].”).  
13. See, e.g., Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309, 1323–
24 (2011) (assuming without deciding that the “deliberate recklessness” 
standard applied by the lower court was sufficient to establish scienter); 
Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 319 n.3 
(2007) (noting that courts of appeals have differed in the degree of 
recklessness required and that “[t]he question whether and when 
recklessness satisfies the scienter requirement is not presented in this 
case”); Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 193 n.12 (“In certain areas of the law 
recklessness is considered to be a form of intentional conduct for 
purposes of imposing liability for some act. We need not address here 
the question whether, in some circumstances, reckless behavior is 
sufficient for civil liability under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.”). 
14. See Richard H. Walker & J. Gordon Seymour, Recent Judicial and 
Legislative Developments Affecting the Private Securities Fraud Class 
Action, 40 Ariz. L. Rev. 1003, 1026 (1998) (“[A]ll Circuits that have 
considered the issue have held that recklessness suffices . . . .”). 
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requirement,15 and section 10(b) was enacted to strengthen, not weaken, 
investor protection as compared to the common law.16 Third, in 1995 
 
15. See, e.g., Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017, 1024 
(6th Cir. 1979) (“At common law, recklessness satisfied the scienter 
requirement for fraud.” (citing Derry v. Peek, (1889) 14 App. Cas. 337 
(H.L.) 374 (appeal taken from Eng.))); Restatement of Torts 
§ 526(b) cmt. e (1938) (“[A] misrepresentation . . . is fraudulent if [the 
maker] is conscious that he has merely a belief in its existence and 
recognizes that there is a chance, more or less great, that the fact may 
not be as it is represented.”); William L. Prosser, Handbook of 
the Law of Torts § 107, at 701 (4th ed. 1971) (noting “general 
agreement” that intent is present when there is “reckless disregard” for 
the truth). 
16. Section 10(b) is based on the common law of fraud. See Huddleston v. 
Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 547 (5th Cir. Unit A Mar. 1981) 
(noting that rule 10b-5 claims are derived from the common law deceit 
action), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 459 U.S. 375 
(1983); Harris v. Am. Inv. Co., 523 F.2d 220, 224 (8th Cir. 1975) 
(“[C]ommon law fraud concepts underlie the securities laws and provide 
guidance as to their reach and application . . . .”); P. Schoenfeld Asset 
Mgmt. LLC v. Cendant Corp., 142 F. Supp. 2d 589, 595 (D.N.J. 2001) 
(noting that, although the tort is statutory in origin, it is grounded in 
common law fraud and deceit); In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 60 F. Supp. 
2d 354, 368 (D.N.J 1999) (noting that even though the tort is statutory 
in origin, it stems from the common law of fraud). The Supreme Court 
often accesses the common law for guidance regarding the meaning of 
section 10(b). See, e.g., Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341 
(2005) (noting that courts have implied a private damages action that 
resembles a common law tort action); Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 
224, 231, 244 n.22 (1988) (noting that statutory actions were designed 
to add to the common law protections provided to investors); Bateman 
Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 310 (1985) 
(commenting that “rigid common-law barriers” have been avoided when 
construing securities laws); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 
227–28 (1980) (“At common law, misrepresentation made for the 
purpose of inducing reliance upon [a] false statement is fraudulent.”). 
Significantly, section 10(b) was meant to strengthen, not weaken 
that common law protection. See, e.g., SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 
401 F.2d 833, 855 (2d Cir. 1968) (noting that section 10(b) should be 
interpreted so as to liberalize the common law in order to effectuate its 
remedial purpose). The Supreme Court has agreed, holding as an 
example that “[a] fundamental purpose” of the federal securities laws, 
including section 10(b), was to replace the common law fraud regime’s 
caveat emptor rule in order “to achieve a high standard of business 
ethics in the securities industry.” SEC v. Capital Gains Research 
Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963).  
Regarding auditors, Congress replaced the very protective state 
common-law Ultramares view that auditors could not be liable for 
negligence to third parties unless those third parties were named in the 
engagement letter, with the broad negligence liability of section 11 of the 
1933 Act, which makes auditors potentially liable to all investors in a 
public offering if the auditors cannot prove their due diligence. See 
Securities Act of 1933 § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2006) (listing auditors and 
other experts as statutory defendants in lawsuits where false statements 
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Congress enacted the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA), 
which contains liability provisions premised upon the existence of 
recklessness-based section 10(b) liability.17 Enactment of provisions 
that have no meaning without recklessness-based liability surely 
signals congressional approval of that liability.18 
3. What form of recklessness is required to satisfy  
the scienter requirement? 
Most lower courts have concluded that for recklessness to suffice, 
it must be nearer true scienter than to gross negligence on the 
negligence → gross negligence → recklessness → scienter continuum.19 
Lower courts commonly require not just recklessness, but “severe” 
recklessness.20 
 
in registration statements injure investors); Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 
174 N.E. 441, 444–45 (N.Y. 1931) (adopting the privity view of auditors’ 
third-party liability for negligence). See generally John Hanna & Edgar 
Turlington, Protection of the Public Under the Securities Exchange Act, 
21 Va. L. Rev. 251, 279 (1935) (“It is certainly safer now for the man 
who wishes through his savings to obtain a stake in corporate property 
in this country than it was before the [1934] Act was passed.”). 
17. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). The PSLRA adopted proportionate, 
rather than joint and several, liability for defendants who are not found 
to have knowingly violated the securities laws. In other words, 
defendants with actual intent remain jointly and severally liable while 
defendants who are only reckless benefit from being only proportionately 
liable (although this protection is limited by two exceptions involving 
“uncollectible shares” stemming from the existence of insolvent co-
defendants). See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(f) (2006). 
18. See Robert A. Prentice, Scheme Liability: Does it Have a Future After 
Stoneridge?, 2009 Wis. L. Rev. 351, 356 (claiming that Congress’s 
enactment of proportionate liability “would have been completely 
pointless if a private right to sue multiple defendants did not exist”). 
19. See, e.g., Greebel v. FTP Software, Inc., 194 F.3d 185, 199 (1st Cir. 
1999) (describing the distinction between recklessness and negligence as 
“not just a difference in degree, but also in kind”); Reiger v. Price 
Waterhouse Coopers LLP, 117 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1014 (S.D. Cal. 2000) 
(“[N]o degree of negligence can satisfy the substantive element of 
scienter, or raise a strong inference of scienter . . . .”).  
20. For instance, the 11th Circuit has held that “severe recklessness” meets 
the scienter standard, noting that 
[s]evere recklessness is limited to those highly unreasonable 
omissions or misrepresentations that involve not merely simple 
or even inexcusable negligence, but an extreme departure from 
the standards of ordinary care, and that present a danger of 
misleading buyers or sellers which is either known to the 
defendant or is so obvious that the defendant must have been 
aware of it. 
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B. The PSLRA’s Role 
Although Hochfelder and succeeding lower-court cases established 
a high standard of liability, Silicon Valley high-tech firms and large 
accounting firms believed that they were the victims of too many 
frivolous class action securities fraud lawsuits pursuant to rule 10b-5 
and other federal securities law provisions.21 Their lobbying procured 
the 1995 enactment of the PSLRA,22 a massively pro-defendant 
reform provision.23 For current purposes, the most significant features 
of the PSLRA were its heightened pleading requirement, especially for 
the scienter element,24 and its provision that the filing of a motion to 
dismiss on grounds of failure to adequately plead scienter (or other 
elements) stays discovery and therefore may prevent plaintiffs from 
procuring evidence to support their claims.25  
After the PSLRA, notice pleading was out, replaced by a 
requirement that any complaint pursuant to rule 10b-5 satisfy two 
specificity obstacles. Plaintiffs must “specify each statement alleged to 
have been misleading, the reason or reasons why the statement is 
misleading, and, if an allegation regarding the statement or omission 
is made on information and belief, the complaint shall state with 
particularity all facts on which that belief is formed.”26 And civil 
damage plaintiffs also must “state with particularity facts giving rise 
 
Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271, 1282 n.18 (11th Cir. 
1999) (quoting McDonald v. Alan Bush Brokerage Co., 863 F.2d 809, 
814 (11th Cir. 1989)).  
According to some courts, “[t]his level of recklessness requires that 
defendants make statements that they know, or have access to 
information suggesting, are materially inaccurate.” Ferris, Baker Watts, 
Inc. v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 395 F.3d 851, 854 (8th Cir. 2005) (citing 
Advanced Data Concepts v. Navarre Corp. (In re Navarre Corp. Sec. 
Litig.), 299 F.3d 735, 746 (8th Cir. 2002)). 
21. Other provisions targeted by the PSLRA include sections 11 and 12 of 
the 1933 Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 77l (2006). 
22. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub L. No. 104-67, 
109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
23. The PSLRA, among other things, replaced joint and several liability 
with proportional liability, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(f) (2006); recognized a 
statutory “bespeaks caution” defense, § 78u-5(c)(1); heightened loss 
causation proof requirements, § 78u-4(b)(4); and created stricter 
damages rules, § 78u-4(e). 
24. § 78u-4(b)(2). 
25. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B). 
26. § 78u-4(b)(1). 
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to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state 
of mind.”27  
The PSLRA set a precedent. In 2007 and 2009, in Bell Atlantic 
Corp. v. Twombly28 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal,29 the Supreme Court raised 
the pleading bar across all federal court cases by requiring plaintiffs to 
articulate a “plausible” basis for their claims, even before they can use 
discovery to seek support for them.30 The PSLRA also raised several 
questions. 
1. How strict is the pleading standard under the PSLRA? 
Because the facts that give rise to a strong inference of scienter 
must be alleged with particularity, many courts hold that plaintiffs 
must plead “the who, what, when, where, and how: the first paragraph 
of any newspaper story.”31 Put another way, a complaint “must (1) 
specify the statements that . . . were fraudulent, (2) identify the 
speaker, (3) state where and when the statements were made, and (4) 
explain why the statements were fraudulent.”32 Other courts, 
however, hold that plaintiffs “need not . . . plead the ‘date, place or 
time’ of the fraud, so long as they use an ‘alternative means of 
injecting precision and some measure of substantiation into their 
allegations of fraud.’”33 And some of these courts have cautioned 
 
27. § 78u-4(b)(2) (emphasis added). See generally Ferris, Baker Watts, Inc. 
v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 395 F.3d 851, 854 (8th Cir. 2005) (applying the 
heightened pleading standard Congress enacted as part of the PSLRA); 
Fla. State Bd. of Admin. v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 270 F.3d 645, 654 
(8th Cir. 2001) (same). 
28. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).  
29. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).  
30. Allegations of acts that are “merely consistent” with a defendant’s 
liability fails to cross the important threshold between possibility and 
plausibility. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557. “The plausibility standard is not 
akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer 
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).  
31. In re Advanta Corp. Sec. Litig., 180 F.3d 525, 534 (3d Cir. 1999) 
(quoting DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624, 627 (7th Cir. 1990)). 
32. ATSI Commc’ns, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 87, 99 (2d Cir. 
2007); see also In re MRU Holdings Sec. Litig., 769 F. Supp. 2d 500, 
508 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (applying the four requirements of the complaint). 
33. Rolo v. City Investing Co. Liquidating Trust, 155 F.3d 644, 658 (3d Cir. 
1998) (quoting Seville Indus. Mach. Corp. v. Southmost Mach. Corp., 
742 F.2d 786, 791 (3d Cir. 1984)); P. Schoenfeld Asset Mgmt. LLC v. 
Cendant Corp., 142 F. Supp. 2d 589, 604 (D.N.J. 2001) (quoting the 
same text from Rolo).  
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against requiring plaintiffs to plead with too much precision issues 
that defendants may have concealed.34  
These disagreements are critical because, as noted above, the 
PSLRA’s discovery stay, which goes into effect upon the filing of any 
motion to dismiss, can make it extremely difficult for plaintiffs to 
obtain the necessary factual details required by most courts in order 
to successfully plead scienter.35 A strict scienter pleading standard can 
create a very significant roadblock to a plaintiff’s prosecution of a rule 
10b-5 claim. 
2. What is a “strong inference”? 
The PSLRA requires plaintiffs to plead scienter with sufficient 
particularity to establish a “strong inference” that the intent 
requirement is met, but the lower courts could not agree on the 
meaning of a “strong inference.”36 The Supreme Court attempted to 
settle the issue in Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights Ltd., where 
it held that a court’s responsibility in applying the PSLRA pleading 
standard 
is not to scrutinize each allegation in isolation but to assess all 
the allegations holistically. In sum, the reviewing court must 
ask: When the allegations are accepted as true and taken 
collectively, would a reasonable person deem the inference of 
scienter at least as strong as any opposing inference? 37  
 
34. See, e.g., Rolo, 155 F.3d at 658 (“Courts should, however, apply the rule 
with some flexibility and should not require plaintiffs to plead issues that 
may have been concealed by the defendants.” (citing Christidis v. First Pa. 
Mortg. Trust, 717 F.2d 96, 99–100 (3d Cir. 1983))); Schoenfeld, 142 F. 
Supp. 2d at 604 (quoting the same text from Rolo). 
35. See Barbara Black, Eliminating Securities Fraud Class Actions Under 
the Radar, 2009 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 802, 816 (arguing that the 
PSLRA’s “tightened pleading standards and bar on discovery,” coupled 
with other factors, will cause underdeterrence of fraud); Hillary A. Sale, 
Heightened Pleading and Discovery Stays: An Analysis of the Effect of 
the PSLRA’s Internal-Information Standard on ’33 and ’34 Act Claims, 
76 Wash. U. L. Rev. 537, 578 (1998) (“[W]hen vigorously applied, 
the combination of a strict pleading standard with a stay of discovery 
creates a pleading barrier so high that few complaints will survive it.” 
(emphasis added)). 
36. Paul A. Griffin & Joseph A. Grundfest, When Does Insider Selling Support 
a “Strong Inference” of Fraud?, 9 Asia-Pac. J. Acct. & Econ. 159, 160 
(2002) (“There is substantial disagreement within the judiciary over the 
proper legal interpretation of this ‘strong inference’ standard.”). 
37. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 326 (2007) 
(emphasis added) (citation omitted). This strict approach is generally 
consistent with the Supreme Court’s holdings in Iqbal and Twombly that 
to survive motions to dismiss complaints must contain sufficient factual 
information that, if accepted as true (as they must be) would state a 
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Given a potential range of competing inferences, the Court essen-
tially ruled that a “tie goes to the plaintiff,” for an inference of scienter 
need not be stronger than competing inferences for the complaint to 
survive a motion to dismiss; it need only be just as strong.38 As 
indicated, the Court also demanded a holistic, rather than merely a 
piecemeal, examination of the evidence.39 
3. How does a plaintiff properly plead and prove scienter? 
Another and more significant issue that predated the PSLRA but 
became even more contentious after its passage regards how a plaintiff 
properly pleads and proves scienter. Many lower courts had 
previously developed two primary means for plaintiffs to prove that a 
defendant acted with requisite scienter. One involved proof of motive 
and opportunity while the other involved the use of circumstantial 
evidence. These remain the two primary ways of establishing scienter 
in the wake of the PSLRA, at least according to many courts.40  
claim “plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 566 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) 
(citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Facial 
plausibility is achieved when plaintiffs plead factual details that allow 
courts to draw reasonable inferences that defendant is liable for the 
alleged conduct. Id. 
38. Michael J. Kaufman & John M. Wunderlich, The Judicial Access 
Barriers to Remedies for Securities Fraud, 75 Law & Contemp. 
Probs. 55, 56 (2012) (“Tellabs did not eliminate the use of circumstan-
tial evidence in pleading, but rather held that when two inferences are 
equally plausible, the tie goes to the plaintiff.”). 
39. See Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 326 (“[T]he court’s job is not to scrutinize each 
allegation in isolation but to assess all the allegations holistically.”). 
Victor Quintanilla argued that Tellabs, by “broaden[ing] the epistemic 
goal of decision-making by requiring federal courts to compare and 
contrast culpable and non-culpable explanations for behavior” will have 
laudable effects. Victor D. Quintanilla, (Mis)Judging Intent: The 
Fundamental Attribution Error in Federal Securities Law, 7 N.Y.U. 
J.L. & Bus. 195, 245 (2010). But Victoria Su surveyed the case law and 
suggested that the “holistic” approach suggested by the Court in Tellabs 
simply gives the circuit courts sufficient latitude to simultaneously 
pretend to follow Tellabs and yet retain their pre-Tellabs tests for 
scienter. See Victoria Su, Note, Scienter After Tellabs, 5 Brook. J. 
Corp. Fin. & Com. L. 527, 547 (2011) (discussing various courts’ 
adjustments in the wake of Tellabs). 
40. “In the Second Circuit, [at least,] a ‘strong inference’ of scienter can be 
established by alleging facts either ‘(1) showing that the defendants had 
both motive and opportunity to commit the [alleged] fraud or (2) 
constituting strong circumstantial evidence of conscious misbehavior or 
recklessness.’” In re Bear Stearns Cos. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 
763 F. Supp. 2d 423, 499 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (quoting ATSI Commc’ns, 
Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 87, 99 (2d Cir. 2007)); see also 
Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp, Inc., 25 F.3d 1124, 1128 (2d Cir. 1994) 
(discussing the two alternatives for establishing a “strong inference”); In 
re Agape Litig., 773 F. Supp. 2d 298, 308 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (same). 
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a. Motive and Opportunity 
Motive41 and opportunity can be established by plaintiffs alleging 
facts indicating that defendant benefitted in a “concrete and personal 
way”42 from the alleged fraud.43 Motives that would be common to all 
actors in the defendants’ position will not suffice.44 Thus, if plaintiffs 
plead merely that corporate insiders manipulated the numbers because 
they wished to maintain a high market price for their company’s stock, 
that would not suffice, even though it would certainly be reasonable to 
believe that defendants would wish to achieve that goal, because almost 
all insiders would have that same motivation.45 In other words, this 
allegation would not help distinguish the motives of fraudsters from the 
motives of all corporate insiders.46 
 
41. Intent and motive are related, but separate. Intent refers to the state of 
mind with which an act is committed, whereas motive is what prompts 
the person to act. See Maurice E. Stucke, Is Intent Relevant?, 8 J.L. 
Econ. & Pol’y 801, 809 (2012). 
42. Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 307 (2d Cir. 2000).  
43. See id. (“Motive would entail concrete benefits that could be realized by 
one or more of the false statements and wrongful nondisclosures 
alleged.” (quoting Shields, 25 F.3d at 1130)); Wilson v. Dalene, 699 F. 
Supp. 2d 534, 558 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (“Motive and opportunity can be 
established by demonstrating that defendants benefitted ‘in a concrete 
and personal way’ from the alleged fraud.” (quoting Trinity BUI v. 
Indus. Enters. of Am., Inc., 594 F. Supp. 2d 364, 370 (S.D.N.Y 2009))); 
In re DRDGOLD Ltd. Sec. Litig., 472 F. Supp. 2d 562, 570 (S.D.N.Y. 
2007) (discussing requirements for an allegation of motive); Queen Uno 
Ltd. v. Coeur D’Alene Mines Corp., 2 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1359 (D. Colo. 
1998) (adopting an approach where plaintiffs, in order to prove a strong 
inference of fraudulent intent, can plead both motive and opportunity).  
44. See Kalnit v. Eichler, 264 F.3d 131, 139 (2d Cir. 2001) (“Motives that are 
generally possessed by most corporate directors and officers do not 
suffice.”); In re Lehman Bros. Sec. & ERISA Litig., 799 F. Supp. 2d 258, 
293 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (containing similar language); Wilson, 699 F. Supp. 
2d at 559 (same); In re DRDGOLD, 472 F. Supp. 2d at 570 (same). 
45. See Kalnit, 264 F.3d at 139 (“Insufficient motives, we have held, can 
include (1) the desire for the corporation to appear profitable and (2) the 
desire to keep stock prices high to increase officer compensation.” (citing 
Novak, 216 F.3d at 307–08)); Wilson, 699 F. Supp. 2d at 559 (discussing 
insufficient corporate motives); In re Merrill Lynch & Co., Research 
Reports Sec. Litig., 272 F. Supp. 2d 243, 262 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (same). 
46. Insider trading by individual defendants is often deemed to satisfy the 
motive requirement, but only if it is unusual in amount or otherwise 
suspicious. See Avon Pension Fund v. GlaxoSmithKline PLC, 343 Fed. 
App’x 671, 673 (2d Cir. 2009) (summary order) (“[U]nusual insider 
trading activity during the class period may permit an inference of bad 
faith and scienter . . . .” (quoting Acito v. IMCERA Grp., Inc., 47 F.3d 
47, 54 (2d Cir. 1995))); In re PEC Solutions, Inc. Sec. Litig., 418 F.3d 
379, 390 (4th Cir. 2005) (noting that insider trading may support an 
inference of scienter if unusual and suspicious); Greebel v. FTP 
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b. Circumstantial Evidence 
The second primary means of alleging scienter involves circum-
stantial evidence that points to more than mere negligence by 
defendants.47 It is difficult to read a person’s mind, so circumstantial 
evidence is the key to proof, or lack thereof, in most types of fraud 
litigation.48 Securities fraud cases are no different. The Supreme Court 
itself has observed that “the proof of scienter required in fraud cases 
is often a matter of inference from circumstantial evidence.”49 That 
said, catch-all or blanket allegations will not meet the particularity 
requirement.50 But circumstantial evidence can pile up so as to render 
incredible a non-fraudulent explanation. 
C. Scienter and Outside Auditors 
The focus of this Article is the scienter requirement as applied to 
rule 10b-5 claims against external auditors. It is clear that the scienter 
requirement does not demand that auditor defendants desire to injure 
people, but only that they be able to foresee that certifying misleading 
financial statements that do not conform to GAAP (generally accepted 
accounting practices) can influence and thereby injure investors.51 
Beyond that, not much is settled. 
 
Software, Inc., 194 F.3d 185, 197–98 (1st Cir. 1999) (“Unusual trading 
or trading at suspicious times or in suspicious amounts by corporate 
insiders has long been recognized as probative of scienter.”). 
47. Fact finders tend to strongly prefer direct evidence over circumstantial 
evidence, even though their prejudice against circumstantial evidence is 
arguably unwarranted and their reliance on direct evidence may 
overvalue its trustworthiness. See, e.g., Eyal Zamir et al., Seeing is 
Believing: The Anti-Inference Bias 3–4, (Apr. 21, 2012) (unpublished 
manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1989561 (“Commenta-
tors generally agree that the prejudice against circumstantial evidence is 
unwarranted. . . . Factfinders tend to undervalue the reliability and 
probative value of circumstantial evidence, . . . and to overvalue the 
trustworthiness and weight of direct evidence, such as eyewitness 
testimonies.” (citations omitted)). 
48. See Clarke v. United States, 132 F.2d 538, 540–41 (9th Cir. 1943) (“It is 
rare when direct proof of the devising of the scheme may be given. In 
most cases it must be inferred.”). 
49. Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 390 n.30 (1983). 
50. See, e.g., Advanced Data Concepts v. Navarre Corp. (In re Navarre 
Corp. Sec. Litig.), 299 F.3d 735, 741 (8th Cir. 2002) (“[W]e disregard ‘catch-
all’ or ‘blanket’ assertions that do not live up to the particularity 
requirements of the statute.” (quoting Fla. State Bd. of Admin. v. Green 
Tree Fin. Corp., 270 F.3d 645, 660 (8th Cir. 2001))). 
51. See, e.g., AUSA Life Ins. Co. v. Ernst & Young, 206 F.3d 202, 221 (2d 
Cir. 2000) (finding requisite scienter based on foreseeability of harm to 
investors); In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 352 F. Supp. 2d 472, 496 
(S.D.N.Y. 2005) (discussing the AUSA decision). 
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1. Should outside auditors receive special treatment  
in application of the scienter standard? 
a. Existence of Special Treatment for Auditors 
To protect auditors from liability, lower courts are often 
especially demanding of plaintiffs attempting to plead fraud against 
auditors.52 The Sixth Circuit, for example, has stated that “the 
meaning of recklessness in securities fraud cases is especially stringent 
when the claim is brought against an outside auditor.”53 Therefore, 
according to some courts, liability attaches in a rule 10b-5 case only 
when the auditor acts with “at least deliberate recklessness.”54 Other 
courts say that auditors’ wrongdoing must “approximate an actual 
intent” to aid the client’s fraud in order to satisfy the recklessness 
standard.55 Others require that the evidence clearly show that the 
 
52. In the Second Circuit, courts tend to say that the scienter pleading 
requirement for auditors is “demanding.” See, e.g., In re Lehman Bros. 
Sec. & ERISA Litig., 799 F. Supp. 2d 258, 302 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“The 
standard for evaluating assertions of an auditor’s scienter . . . is 
demanding.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); In re IMAX Sec. 
Litig., 587 F. Supp. 2d 471, 483 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (“The standard for 
pleading auditor scienter is demanding.”); In re Scottish Re Grp. Sec. 
Litig., 524 F. Supp. 2d 370, 385 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (“The standard for 
pleading auditor scienter is demanding.” (quoting In re Refco, Inc. Sec. 
Litig., 503 F. Supp. 2d 611, 657 (S.D.N.Y. 2007))). It is “more exacting” 
than the standard for other securities fraud defendants. In re Fannie 
Mae 2008 Sec. Litig., 742 F. Supp. 2d 382, 412 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
53. PR Diamonds, Inc. v. Chandler, 364 F.3d 671, 693 (6th Cir. 2004) 
(citing In re SmarTalk Teleservices, Inc. Sec. Litig., 124 F. Supp. 2d 
505, 514 (S.D. Ohio 2000)). Much more than a simple audit failure is 
required for the auditor to be liable. “It is well-settled that violations of 
GAAP and GAAS, standing alone, do not create an inference of 
scienter, much less a strong one.” Id. at 694 (citing In re Comshare, Inc. 
Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 542, 553 (6th Cir. 1999)). 
54. See, e.g., In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 985 (9th 
Cir. 1999) (“The PSLRA requires, to repeat, that [plaintiff] state with 
particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference of the required state 
of mind, i.e., at least deliberate recklessness.” (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78u-
4(b)(2) (1997))); Kelley v. Rambus, Inc., 384 Fed. App’x 570, 573 (9th 
Cir. 2010) (“Kelley’s claims under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 fail to 
sufficiently allege ‘particular facts giving rise to a strong inference of 
deliberate recklessness.’” (quoting In re Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at 
979)); In re Verifone Holdings Sec. Litig., No. C 07-6140 MHP, 2011 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24964, at *18–21 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2011) (explaining 
the plaintiff’s burden). 
55. See, e.g., Rothman v. Gregor, 220 F.3d 81, 98 (2d Cir. 2000) (“For 
‘recklessness on the part of a non-fiduciary accountant’ to satisfy 
securities fraud scienter . . . [‘i]t must, in fact, approximate an actual 
intent to aid in the fraud being perpetrated by the audited company.’” 
(quoting Decker v. Massey-Ferguson, Ltd., 681 F.2d 111, 120–21 (2d 
Cir. 1982))); La. Mun. Police Emps. Ret. Sys. v. KPMG LLP, 822 F. 
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auditor either aided the fraud or was so egregiously irresponsible that 
no other accountant would have acted in the same manner.56 Still 
other courts have held that when the recklessness standard for auditors 
is combined with the stringent PSLRA pleading provisions, “a simple 
rule emerges: to allege that an independent accountant or auditor 
acted with scienter, the complaint must allege specific facts showing 
that the deficiencies in the audit were so severe that they strongly 
suggest that the auditor must have been aware of the corporation’s 
fraud.”57 These approaches nearly eliminate recklessness as a basis of 
auditor liability, although it is unanimously recognized by lower 
courts as sufficient for all other rule 10b-5 defendants.  
The special treatment provided to auditors is generally accepted, 
with Professor Coffee going so far as to opine that auditors have 
“virtual immunity” under federal securities laws.58 Perhaps the 
strongest evidence that auditors are subject to special treatment is the 
fact that auditors are rarely named as defendants in securities class 
actions, even when their clients are accused of accounting fraud.59 
 
Supp. 2d 711, 721 (N.D. Ohio 2011) (noting that recklessness must 
approximate intent to establish scienter); Lehman Bros., 799 F. Supp. 
2d at 302 (same); Fannie Mae, 742 F. Supp. 2d at 412 (same).  
56. See, e.g., PR Diamonds, 364 F.3d at 693–94 (“The [plaintiff] must prove 
that the accounting practices were so deficient that the audit amounted 
to no audit at all, or an egregious refusal to see the obvious, or to 
investigate the doubtful, or that the accounting judgments which were 
made were such that no reasonable accountant would have made the 
same decisions if confronted with the same facts.” (quoting Miller v. 
Pezzani (In re Worlds of Wonder Sec. Litig.), 35 F.3d 1407, 1426 (9th 
Cir. 1994))); La. Mun. Police, 822 F. Supp. 2d at 721 (quoting PR 
Diamonds). 
57. SmarTalk, 124 F. Supp. 2d at 514 (emphasis added) (citing Hollinger v. 
Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 1564, 1570 (9th Cir. 1990) (en banc)); see 
also PR Diamonds, 364 F.3d at 694 (quoting SmarTalk); In re Crocs, 
Inc. Sec. Litig., 774 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1154 (Colo. 2011) (same). 
58. John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on 
Deterrence and its Implementation, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 1534, 1550 
(2006). While the PSLRA accorded securities fraud defendants special 
protection, the wave of Enron-era scandals soon followed and many 
thought that enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Pub. L. No. 107-
204, 116 Stat. 745, in 2002 might shift things dramatically back in the 
other direction. But a recent study indicates that auditor liability risk 
after 2002 has actually decreased. See Ross D. Fuerman, Auditors and 
the Post-2002 Litigation Environment, 24 Res. Acct. Reg. 40, 44 
(2012) (“Analysis of 1169 lawsuits filed between 2001 and 2008 found 
that auditor litigation severity decreased after 2002. . . . Thus, there 
appears to have occurred, after 2002, a reduction in auditor liability 
risk, compared to the 2001–2002 period.”). 
59. For instance, Cornerstone Research finds that auditors were named at 
an annual rate of only 1%–6% of securities class action cases between 
2006 and 2010, while GAAP violations were alleged in 26%–57% of 
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b. Rationale for Special Treatment for Auditors 
This differential treatment of auditors is not justified by any 
language in section 10(b) or rule 10b-5. Nor is it supported by any 
policy considerations contained in the ’34 Act’s legislative history.60 
The Supreme Court has not issued any rulings that would directly 
justify this differentiation. Nor do the PSLRA’s provisions or legislative 
history provide any clear support for a differential treatment of auditors 
regarding the pleading of scienter, although the impact of many of its 
provisions was very kind to them.61  
 
cases. Cornerstone Research, Securities Class Action Filings: 
2010 Year In Review 32 fig.29 (2011), available at http://securities. 
stanford.edu/clearinghouse_research/2010_YIR/Cornerstone_Research
_Filings_2010_YIR.pdf. Similar results were obtained in earlier time 
periods as well. E.g., Ross D. Fuerman, Auditors and the Post-Litigation 
Reform Act Environment, 14 Res. Acct. Reg. 213 (2000) (“[A]uditors 
are named defendants in a lower percentage of class actions in 1998 than 
in previous years . . . .”). 
60. While the PSLRA’s scienter pleading requirements nowhere distinguish 
between corporate defendants and accountants, courts have imposed 
clear distinctions. See Sherrie R. Savett, Securities Class Actions Since 
the 1995 Reform Act: A Plaintiff’s Perspective, in Securities 
Litigation & Enforcement Institute 2005, at 17, 62–63 (PLI Law 
& Practice, Course Handbook Ser. No. B-1505, 2005) (discussing 
scienter pleading requirements with respect to accountants); Gideon 
Mark, Accounting Fraud: Pleading Scienter of Auditors Under the 
PSLRA, 39 Conn. L. Rev. 1097, 1175–76 (2007) (“Some of the district 
court opinions have all but foreclosed the possibility that plaintiffs could 
ever successfully plead scienter of an external auditor based on motive 
and opportunity.”). At least one court agrees. See In re AOL Time 
Warner, Inc. Sec. & “ERISA” Litig., 381 F. Supp. 2d 192, 239 n.49 
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (“Ernst & Young’s protestations notwithstanding, Rule 
9(b) does not contemplate a higher standard for pleading fraud by an 
independent auditor than for pleading fraud by any other 10(b) 
defendant.”). Some courts have resisted creating a two-tiered standard 
that favors auditors. See, e.g., N.M. State Inv. Council v. Ernst & 
Young LLP, 641 F.3d 1089, 1095 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[T]his Court has 
previously advised against developing ‘separate[ ] rules of thumb for each 
type of scienter allegation.’” (quoting S. Ferry LP, # 2 v. Killinger, 542 
F.3d 776, 784 (9th Cir. 2008))). 
61. Although GAAP violations are generally featured in a significant 
portion of securities fraud class actions (e.g., 44% in 2005 and 68% in 
2006), from 1995 to 2006 auditors were named as defendants in just 
8.4% of such suits. See Eric L. Talley, Cataclysmic Liability Risk Among 
Big Four Auditors, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 1641, 1682 (2006). 
These developments occurred parallel to a diminished emphasis by 
the SEC on monitoring of accounting firms that lasted until Sarbanes-
Oxley was enacted in 2002. See John C. Coffee, Jr., What Caused 
Enron? A Capsule Social and Economic History of the 1990s, 89 
Cornell L. Rev. 269, 290 (2004) (“[F]rom some point in the 1980s 
until the late 1990s, the SEC shifted its enforcement focus away from 
actions against the Big Five accounting firms towards other priorities.”); 
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The grounds for being especially solicitous of external auditors are 
typically unexplained even in court opinions that explicitly grant this 
extra protection. One reason some courts have given to justify special 
treatment for auditors is the notion that “there are limits to the scope 
of liability for failure adequately to monitor the allegedly fraudulent 
behavior of others.”62 Although these differential standards for outside 
auditors may be defended as generally consistent with a special 
solicitousness that the Supreme Court has exhibited for secondary 
actors in securities fraud cases, the rationale is also undermined by 
these same cases. While it might once have been seriously argued that 
auditors had to worry about facing liability for failing to adequately 
monitor their clients’ fraudulent conduct, today they can be liable for 
rule 10b-5 civil damages only for making false statements themselves. 
The 1994 Central Bank case eliminated any auditor civil damage 
liability for aiding and abetting clients’ fraud.63 The 2008 Stoneridge 
case held that auditors cannot be liable even for their own fraudulent 
statements that helped fool third parties if investors did not rely 
directly upon those fraudulent statements.64 And, most recently, 
Janus Capital held that a defendant’s (including presumably an 
outsider auditor’s) own fraudulent statements cannot be actionable 
unless that defendant’s fraudulent activities were known to investors 
at the time they made their investment decisions.65 
 
Jay M. Feinman, Liability of Accountants for Negligent Auditing: 
Doctrine, Policy, and Ideology, 31 Fla. St. L. Rev. 17, 60 (2003) 
(“Although the [SEC] . . . [has] the formal authority to discipline 
accountants, that authority is rarely exercised.”); Cassell Bryan-Low, 
SEC May Take Tougher Stance on Accountants in Audit Failures, 
Wall St. J., Dec. 13, 2002, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB103973735 
229267033.html (“During the past 25 years, the SEC has sued large 
accounting firms fewer than 10 times for audit failures . . . .”); see also 
A.C. Pritchard, The Irrational Auditor and Irrational Liability, 10 Lewis 
& Clark L. Rev. 19, 54 (2006) (“Under the PSLRA, defendants who are 
only tangentially involved in the fraud will not face potentially bank-
rupting liability, so accountants do not have to serve as quasi-guarantors 
for the solvency of their clients.”).  
62. Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 309 (2d Cir. 2000). Because Central 
Bank, Stoneridge, and Janus Capital make it clear that auditors cannot 
be liable under section 10(b) or rule 10b-5 for simply failing to ade-
quately monitor the frauds of others, this rationale is less persuasive. 
63. Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 
511 U.S. 164, 184, 188–89 (1994). 
64. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 
166–67 (2008). 
65. Janus Capital Grp., Inc., v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 
2302 (2011). Between the Supreme Court and the PSLRA, external 
auditors are already receiving substantial protection from liability, 
which mitigates any need to accord them special scienter protection. On 
the other hand, the audit firms can respond that notwithstanding these 
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A second rationale for giving auditors special protection from 
securities liability is based primarily upon the assumptions that (a) 
auditors are rational actors and (b) a short-term profit earned by 
looking the other way while a client commits fraud would be 
outweighed by the profits auditors can gain by maintaining a good 
reputation.66 Although there are persuasive reasons to doubt both of 
these assumptions,67 courts have continued to apply them without ever 
addressing the substantial body of evidence that undermines them.68  
 
cases, they still face SEC civil and Department of Justice criminal 
liability for aiding and abetting fraud and for making fraudulent 
statements from the shadows. They could argue that this liability is 
enough to motivate them to act properly, even though they are specially 
protected from liability in private damage actions. Whatever the merits 
of this debate, most courts grant auditors special protection when scienter 
is at issue. 
66. The most prominent proponent of this point of view is Judge 
Easterbrook. See DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624, 629 (7th Cir. 
1990) (Easterbrook, J.) (“An accountant’s greatest asset is its 
reputation for honesty, followed closely by its reputation for careful 
work. Fees for two years’ audits could not approach the losses 
[defendant] would suffer from a perception that it would muffle a client’s 
fraud.”). Many other courts have found these assumptions persuasive. 
See, e.g., In re Suprema Specialties, Inc. Sec. Litig., 438 F.3d 256, 282 
(3d Cir. 2006) (“The fact that the [auditors] earned fees for their 
services does not establish that they acted with any culpable intent.”); 
Miller v. Pezzani (In re Worlds of Wonder Sec. Litig.), 35 F.3d 1407, 
1427 n.7 (9th Cir. 1994) (rejecting the argument that “the auditor had 
become ‘entangled’ with [defendant] by offering discounts on its fees”); 
Melder v. Morris, 27 F.3d 1097, 1103 (5th Cir. 1994) (“[W]e will not 
indulge irrational inferences of the firm’s fraudulent intent based on 
these generic allegations.”); Reiger v. Price Waterhouse Coopers LLP, 
117 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1007 (S.D. Cal. 2000) (“[A] large independent 
accountant will rarely, if ever, have any rational economic incentive to 
participate in its client’s fraud.”). 
67. See Max H. Bazerman et al., Why Good Accountants Do Bad Audits, 
Harv. Bus. Rev., Nov. 2002, at 96, 99 (arguing that accountants have 
strong reasons to stay in clients’ good graces especially because “accounting 
firms have increasingly treated audits as ways to build relationships that 
allow them to sell their more lucrative consulting services”); Mark, supra 
note 60, at 1174–1205 (arguing that the DiLeo line of cases are wrongly 
decided); Robert A. Prentice, The Case of the Irrational Auditor: A 
Behavioral Insight Into Securities Fraud Litigation, 95 Nw. U. L. Rev. 
133, 218 (2000) (“[I]t is inappropriate to assume . . . (a) that auditors and 
audit firms are rational in the sense of the rational utility maximizer of 
the traditional economic model, and (b) that it is always irrational for 
auditors and audit firms to act recklessly or fraudulently.”). All of these 
articles mine the literature of behavioral psychology and related fields to 
argue that auditors and audit firms, like most individuals and organ-
izations, do not act rationally much of the time. Even if they did, there 
are many very practical reasons, including the lack of real competition 
among audit firms, the tremendous costs to audit clients of switching 
firms, and the short-term advantages that individual auditors could gain 
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Class action attorneys argue that there are significant collateral 
consequences to the application of an unreasonably high pleading 
standard regarding accountants, including that “the corporation and 
corporate insiders can then blame the absentee accountants, using the 
classic ‘empty chair defense,’ a powerful jury argument for avoiding 
management liability.”69 But these pleas have failed to sway most 
courts, which continue to cloak auditors with special protection. 
c. Scope of Special Treatment for Auditors 
Representative of the special protections accorded by most courts 
to external auditors when scienter pleading is at issue is the common, 
but arguably extreme, “no audit at all” test. This most pro-auditor 
formulation requires dismissal of a complaint unless it alleges that the 
defendant auditors’ actions amounted to “no audit at all”70 or, at 
 
by making decisions that might undermine the long-term reputation of 
their firms, that make it rational for auditors to sometimes violate the 
rules. See id. at 202–07 (explaining that there is more price competition 
than quality competition among auditors and providing an example of how 
several firms had used temporary workers for tax returns while charging 
premium prices). David Kahn and Gary Lawson have observed that 
it is hard to dispute the evidence of what actually happens. 
“Despite the clear logic of the gatekeeper rationale, experience 
over the 1990s suggests that professional gatekeepers do acquiesce 
in managerial fraud, even though the apparent reputational losses 
seem to dwarf the gains to be made from the individual client.” 
Or, as King Arthur said to the Black Knight in Monty Python 
and the Holy Grail when the Black Knight refused to acknowledge 
that both of his arms had been cut off: “Look!” 
David B. Kahn & Gary S. Lawson, Who’s the Boss? Controlling Auditor 
Incentives Through Random Selection, 53 Emory L.J. 391, 405 (2004) 
(footnotes omitted) (quoting John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding Enron: 
“It’s About the Gatekeepers, Stupid”, 57 Bus. Law. 1403, 1405 (2002); 
Monty Python and the Holy Grail (Python (Monty) Pictures 1975)).  
68. The “reputation always outweighs fees” argument has been accepted 
even when the defendant firm was very small (allegedly “a couple of 
guys in a strip mall down in . . . New Jersey”). In re MRU Holdings 
Sec. Litig., 769 F. Supp. 2d 500, 519 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). One familiar with 
Bernard Madoff’s auditor, who collected healthy fees for years without 
ever doing a substantive audit, certainly might wonder about the 
strength of the reputational constraint upon small firms. See Diana B. 
Henriques, The Wizard of Lies 254–55 (2011) (investing along with 
other members of his accounting firm in Madoff’s brokerage firm while he 
had falsely certified that he had done professional auditing services). 
69. Melvyn I. Weiss & Elizabeth A. Berney, Essay, Restoring Investor Trust 
in Auditing Standards and Accounting Principles, 41 Harv. J. on 
Legis. 29, 31–32 (2004).  
70. See, e.g., Ferris, Baker Watts, Inc. v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 395 F.3d 851, 
855 (8th Cir. 2005) (applying without necessarily adopting the “no audit at 
all” standard); Thomas H. Lee Equity Fund V, L.P. v. Grant Thornton 
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most, to a “pretended audit.”71 As most commonly phrased, this test, 
which might be called the Price Waterhouse test,72 provides that 
plaintiffs must plead and prove  
that the accounting practices were so deficient that the audit 
amounted to no audit at all, or an egregious refusal to see the 
obvious, or to investigate the doubtful, or that the accounting 
judgments which were made were such that no reasonable 
accountant would have made the same decisions if confronted 
with the same facts.73 
 
LLP (In re Refco Inc. Sec. Litig.), No. 07 Civ. 8663 (JSR), 2011 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 33554, at *39–40 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2011) (discussing how “no 
audit at all” is one way to prove scienter); In re Franklin Bank Corp. Sec. 
Litig., 782 F. Supp. 2d 364, 402 (S.D. Tex. 2011) (“It must be established 
not merely that there was a deviation from accounting principles, but that 
the accounting practices were so deficient that the audit amounted to no 
audit at all . . . .”); In re Bear Stearns Cos. Sec., Derivative, & ERISA 
Litig., 763 F. Supp. 2d 423, 511 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (describing the “no audit 
at all” standard as the applicable standard); In re IMAX Sec. Litig., 587 F. 
Supp. 2d 471, 483 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (using the “no audit at all” standard as 
another way to describe the applicable standard); Maiden v. Merge Techs., 
No. 06-C-349, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84083, at *11–12 (E.D. Wis. Oct. 20, 
2008) (finding that advising against side agreements did not amount to “no 
audit at all”); In re Scottish Re Grp. Sec. Litig., 524 F. Supp. 2d 370, 385 
(S.D.N.Y. 2007) (describing the “no audit at all” standard as “demanding”); 
In re Wet Seal, Inc. Sec. Litig., 518 F. Supp. 2d 1148, 1163 (C.D. Cal. 2007) 
(explaining that deliberate GAAP violations do not rise to “no audit at 
all”); Lewis v. Straka, No. 05C1008, 2007 U.S. Dist. Lexis 59054, at *5 
(E.D. Wis., Aug. 13, 2007) (noting that a strong inference of scienter for an 
auditor would have to amount “no audit at all”). 
71. See, e.g., Rothman v. Gregor, 220 F.3d 81, 98 (2d Cir. 2000) (noting 
that scienter can be established by a “pretended audit”); McLean v. 
Alexander, 599 F.2d 1190, 1198 (3d Cir. 1979) (stressing that a 
“plaintiff need not produce direct evidence of a defendant’s state of 
mind” and that circumstantial evidence such as a “pretended audit” 
may often be the principal means of proving bad faith); In re 
WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 352 F. Supp. 2d 472, 496 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) 
(showing how circumstantial evidence such as a “pretended audit” can 
prove scienter); In re AOL Time Warner, Inc. Sec. & “ERISA” Litig., 
381 F. Supp. 2d 192, 239 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (“Recklessness requires a 
showing that the auditor’s practices ‘amount[ed] at best to a pretended 
audit.’” (quoting Rothman, 220 F.3d at 98)).  
72. While the courts have applied the “no audit at all” standard primarily 
in class action cases for damages, they have also applied it to SEC 
actions. E.g., SEC v. Gold, No. 05-CV-4713 (JS) (MLO), 2006 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 87042, at *12 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 18, 2006); SEC v. KPMG 
LLP, 412 F. Supp. 2d 349, 379 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). Indeed, it apparently 
originated in just such a case, SEC v. Price Waterhouse, 797 F. Supp. 
1217, 1240 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). 
73. Miller v. Pezzani (In re Worlds of Wonder Sec. Litig.), 35 F.3d 1407, 1426 
(9th Cir. 1994) (emphasis added); see also PR Diamonds, Inc. v. Chandler, 
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As phrased, this is an extremely malleable standard. Note that this for-
mulation of the standard allows courts to apply anywhere from a nearly 
impossibly high bar (“no audit at all”) to a standard that is arguably so 
low as to improperly require only negligence rather than scienter (“no 
reasonable accountant would have made the same decision”).74 
2. How does the motive and opportunity test  
apply to external auditors? 
As noted earlier, most courts allow plaintiffs pleading scienter to 
point to both the motive and opportunity of defendants and the 
circumstantial evidence indicating that they have acted fraudulently. 
Regarding the motive and opportunity test, auditors generally cannot 
profit by millions of dollars from corporate fraud like company 
insiders can, so their economic incentives to commit fraud are 
arguably not nearly as strong as those of their clients and their 
clients’ employees. Therefore, unless auditors take bribes or engage in 
insider trading, two presumably rare events (especially given 
professional independence strictures against an auditor’s owning stock 
in a client75), it seems very difficult for plaintiffs to plead scienter by 
auditor defendants via the motive and opportunity test.76 This is 
 
364 F.3d 671, 693–94 (6th Cir. 2004) (using the same standard); 
Dannenberg v. Painewebber, Inc. (In re Software Toolworks, Inc. Sec. 
Litig.), 50 F.3d 615, 627 (9th Cir. 1994) (also using that standard). 
74. When this standard is applied, courts may conclude that liability may 
arise if an auditor’s “judgment—at the moment exercised—was 
sufficiently egregious such that a reasonable accountant reviewing the 
facts and figures should have concluded that [those] financial statements 
were misstated and that as a result the public was likely to be misled.” 
In re IKON Office Solutions, Inc., Sec. Litig., 277 F.3d 658, 673 (3d Cir. 
2002); see also Malack v. BDO Seidman, LLP (In re Am. Bus. Fin. 
Servs. Noteholders Litig.), No. 08-0784, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61450, at 
*24 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 11, 2008) (quoting language from IKON above). 
75. Code of Professional Conduct and Bylaws § 101.02 (Am. Inst. of 
Certified Pub. Accountants 2011). 
76. This is not to say that accountants never get into trouble for insider 
trading. Despite the seeming irrationality of risking their professional 
reputation, they do engage in insider trading from time to time. See, e.g., 
Rosenthal v. N.Y. Univ., No. 10-4168-cv, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 9817, at 
*11–12 (2d Cir. May 16, 2012) (affirming university’s decision not to grant 
an MBA candidate his degree after he admitted abusing his position as a 
professional accountant to conduct insider trading); United States v. 
Ruggiero, 56 F.3d 647, 655–56 (5th Cir. 1995) (finding a senior auditor and 
his acquaintance had engaged in insider trading); SEC v. Svoboda, 409 F. 
Supp. 2d 331, 337 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (describing how a bank’s independent 
accountant traded in securities after receiving inside information); In re Ng, 
Exchange Act Release No. 67,423, Accounting and Auditing Enforcement 
Release No. 3393, Administrative Proceeding File No. 3-14947 (July 12, 
2012) (ordering defendant to cease and desist from causing any violations of 
section 10(b) and barring him from acting as an accountant); In re 
 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 63·Issue 2·2012 
Scienter Pleading and Rule 10b-5 
463 
 
Peterson, Exchange Act Release No. 67,282, Accounting and Auditing 
Enforcement Release No. 3391, Administrative Proceeding File No. 3-14931 
(June 27, 2012) (suspending accountant due to insider trading); In re 
Konyndyk, Exchange Act Release No. 65,882, Accounting and Auditing 
Enforcement Release No. 3339, Administrative Proceeding File No. 3-14651 
(Dec. 5, 2011) (trading in call options during the week before company 
announced it would acquire another company by tender offer); SEC v. 
Deskovick, Litigation Release No. 21,890, 100 SEC Docket 2519 (Mar. 18, 
2011) (tipping close friend over potential sale and merger); SEC v. Acord, 
Litigation Release No. 21132, 96 SEC Docket 1084 (July 15, 2009) (abusing 
positions of trust and confidence by buying $329,000 worth of stock before 
the company’s acquisition); SEC v. Chavarria, Litigation Release No. 
20,313, 91 SEC Docket 2137 (Sept. 28, 2007) (engaging in unlawful insider 
trading by purchasing securities in advance of an earnings release); SEC v. 
Abide, Litigation Release No. 19,776, 88 SEC Docket 1596 (July 27, 2006) 
(making and directing others to make improper accounting entries to 
conceal improperly capitalized expenses); SEC v. Herwitz, Litigation 
Release No. 19,499, 86 SEC Docket 2542, 2542 (Dec. 19, 2005) (settling 
insider trading action against a former president of an accounting firm); 
United States v. Robles, Litigation Release No. 17,778, 78 SEC Docket 1782 
(Oct. 8, 2002) (discussing a criminal suit where an accountant was 
convicted of nine counts of securities fraud, four counts of tender offer fraud, 
and one count of conspiracy); SEC v. Iacovelli, Litigation Release No. 
17,280, 76 SEC Docket 1275 (Dec. 19, 2001) (reselling 315,000 shares to 
realize illegal profits of $272,182); SEC v. Martin, Litigation Release No. 
17141, 75 SEC Docket 1950 (Sept. 20, 2001) (exchanging tax planning 
advice for insider information); SEC v. Dornfeld, Litigation Release No. 
16,869, 74 SEC Docket 520 (Jan. 23, 2001) (trading in advance of public 
announcement of merger); SEC v. Humphries, Litigation Release No. 
16,361, 71 SEC Docket 216 (Nov. 18, 1999) (acting on insider information 
about a potential merger between Exxon and Mobil); SEC v. Hedén, 51 F. 
Supp. 2d 296 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (freezing the defendant’s accounts and his 
family’s account, which he used interchangeably, because the SEC was 
likely to succeed on the merits of an insider trading investigation); SEC v. 
Drabinsky, Litigation Release No. 16,033, 68 SEC Docket 2925 (Jan. 21, 
1999) (assisting company’s directors in manipulating income and cash flows 
and engaging in insider trading of the company’s securities); SEC v. Beers, 
Litigation Release No. 15,823, 67 SEC Docket 1558 (July 30, 1998) (buying 
1,000 shares of stock while in possession of material, nonpublic information); 
SEC v. Kotecha, Litigation Release No. 15,765, 67 SEC Docket 648 (June 3, 
1998) (using inside information to open and close positions in call and put 
options in a company’s stock); SEC v. Hirsch, Litigation Release No. 15,607, 
66 SEC Docket 575 (Jan. 6, 1998) (giving non-public information to brother 
who shared that information with multiple people); SEC v. Sargent, 
Litigation Release No. 14,854, 61 SEC Docket 1552 (Mar. 25, 1996) 
(receiving and acting on material, nonpublic information); SEC v. Evans, 
Litigation Release No. 14,767, 60 SEC Docket 2694 (Dec. 28, 1995) (finding 
a senior accountant had tipped off his brother and his friend after doing due 
diligence in preparation for a three-way merger); SEC v. Blair, Litigation 
Release No. 13,956, 55 SEC Docket 2765 (Feb. 3, 1994) (asking former 
fiancée to make stock purchases for him and providing funds to do so); SEC 
v. Weinstein, Litigation Release No. 13,336, 52 SEC Docket 946 (Aug. 11, 
1992) (ordering an accountant to pay civil damages in excess of $214,000 
due to insider trading); SEC v. Adams, Litigation Release No. 11,439, 38 
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particularly true because the courts reject as insufficient the pleading 
of auditors’ most obvious economic motive for intentionally 
overlooking an audit client’s fraud—they wish to keep the client as a 
client and retain the audit-related and consulting-related revenue 
flowing from that client. Although at least one court seemed amenable 
to the notion that preserving the existence of an accountant-client 
relationship might provide evidence of motive,77 virtually all other 
courts view this as a “general motive” that applies to all auditor 
defendants and is therefore worthless for pleading scienter against a 
specific auditor in a specific case.78 
 
SEC Docket 498 (May 20, 1987) (accountants improperly communicated 
information). 
77. See In re Leslie Fay Cos. Sec. Litig., 835 F. Supp. 167, 174 (S.D.N.Y. 
1993) (holding that the existence of an accountant-client relationship, in 
addition to an “unlikely degree of mere carelessness” on the part of the 
accountant gives rise to an inference of motive). 
78. Loss aversion, the fact that people dread losses more than they anticipate 
gains, provides psychological evidence for the conclusion that auditors 
might well be strongly motivated to please a current client to avoid losing 
the client to another audit firm. See generally Robin M. Hogarth, 
Educating Intuition 166–67 (2001) (describing loss aversion). The 
Supreme Court has intuited accurately that an accountant would be 
more likely to commit fraud to keep a current client happy than to 
acquire a new client. Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 772 (1993). But 
see Miller v. Pezzani (In re Worlds of Wonder Sec. Litig.), 35 F.3d 
1407, 1427 n.7 (9th Cir. 1994) (rejecting this argument as “utterly 
without merit”); Shields v. Citytrust Bankcorp, Inc., 25 F.3d 1124, 1130 
(2d Cir. 1994) (“In looking for a sufficient allegation of motive, we 
assume that the defendant is acting in his or her informed economic self-
interest.”); DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624, 629 (7th Cir. 1990) 
(describing how it would have been irrational for the firm to have 
participated in the fraud); In re AOL Time Warner, Inc. Sec. & 
“ERISA” Litig., 381 F. Supp. 2d 192, 239 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (“[C]ompen-
sation and maintenance of a profitable business relationship for auditing 
services do not constitute a sufficient motive for scienter”); Queen Uno 
Ltd. v. Coeur D’Alene Mines Corp., 2 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1360 (D. Colo. 
1998) (characterizing allegations that Ernst & Young was motivated to 
commit fraud to ensure continued receipt of audit fees from client as 
“absurd”); ICD Holdings S.A. v. Frankel, 976 F. Supp. 234, 245 n.51 
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) (“[T]he fact that the professional service firms like 
[defendant] receive fees for their services is insufficient to supply the 
motive essential to the motive-and-opportunity theory . . . .”); Duncan 
v. Pencer, No. 94 Civ. 0321 (LAP), 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 401, at *33 
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding it would be “economically irrational” for a large 
accounting firm to “condone a client’s fraud in order to preserve a fee 
that, at best, is an infinitesimal percentage of its annual revenues and, by 
doing so, jeopardize its reputation and license, as well as subject itself to 
potential damages literally tens of thousands of times as large as its fee”).  
Of course, the fact that all auditors generally would like to keep 
clients and attendant income and that individual auditors would all like 
to keep their jobs does not mean that sometimes audit firms and 
 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 63·Issue 2·2012 
Scienter Pleading and Rule 10b-5 
465 
3. How does the circumstantial evidence test apply to auditors? 
As Professor Coffee has pointed out, with strict judicial 
assumptions that auditors do not act with reckless or fraudulent 
motives in place, “the plaintiff faces a ‘Catch 22’ dilemma in suing the 
auditor: it cannot plead fraud with particularity until it obtains 
discovery, and it cannot obtain discovery under the PSLRA until it 
pleads fraud with particularity.”79 This often makes it impossible for 
plaintiffs to collect the circumstantial evidence that is the only 
remaining route to pleading scienter against an auditor. 
So, how does the circumstantial evidence test apply to auditors? 
Where motive is not alleged and plaintiffs rely entirely on 
circumstantial evidence to support allegations of recklessness, the 
evidence presented must be proportionally greater, according to some 
courts,80 although most courts do not explicitly require this greater 
proportionality. In accounting cases, catch-all or blanket allegations 
often comprise mere claims of misreported numbers or GAAP and 
GAAS (generally accepted auditing standards) violations; courts nearly 
unanimously hold that such allegations, standing alone, will not 
suffice.81 “[T]he mere publication of inaccurate accounting figures, or a 
failure to follow GAAP, without more, does not establish scienter.”82 
 
individual auditors do not commit fraud for these purposes. See 
Oppenheimer-Palmieri Fund v. Peat Marwick Main & Co. (In re Crazy 
Eddie Sec. Litig.), 812 F. Supp. 338, 344 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) (explaining 
that auditor told client officer that he did not investigate a suspicious 
transaction because he might have had to leave account). 
79. Coffee, supra note 67, at 1410 n.35. 
80. See, e.g., Beck v. Mfrs. Hanover Trust Co., 820 F.2d 46, 50 (2d Cir. 1987) 
(“Where motive is not apparent, it is still possible to plead scienter by 
identifying circumstances indicating conscious behavior by the defendant, 
though the strength of the circumstantial evidence must be correspondingly 
greater.” (citations omitted)); In re Fannie Mae 2008 Sec. Litig., 742 F. 
Supp. 2d 382, 397 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (noting that without an apparent 
motive, circumstantial evidence of scienter must be correspondingly higher); 
Zucker v. Sasaki, 963 F. Supp. 301, 309 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (noting that 
circumstantial evidence must be proportionally greater). 
81. See, e.g., Kushner v. Beverly Enters., Inc. 317 F.3d 820, 831 (8th Cir. 
2003) (“Allegations of GAAP violations are insufficient to state a 
securities fraud claim unless coupled with evidence of corresponding 
fraudulent intent.”); Migliaccio v. K-tel Int’l, Inc. (In re K-tel Int’l, Inc. 
Sec. Litig.), 300 F.3d 881, 890 (8th Cir. 2002) (“Allegations of GAAP 
violations are insufficient, standing alone, to raise an inference of 
scienter.” (quoting Advanced Data Concepts v. Navarre Corp. (In re 
Navarre Corp. Sec. Litig.), 299 F.3d 735, 745 (8th Cir. 2002))); Novak v. 
Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 309 (2d Cir. 2000) (“[A]llegations of GAAP 
violations or accounting irregularities, standing alone, are insufficient to 
state a securities fraud claim.”); Stevelman v. Alias Research, Inc., 174 
F.3d 79, 84 (2d Cir. 1999) (“Allegations of a violation of GAAP 
provisions or SEC regulations, without corresponding fraudulent intent, 
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What “more” might suffice for plaintiffs attempting to plead 
scienter? Consider the following factors that are often raised by 
plaintiffs as circumstantial evidence of auditor scienter. 
a. Size of Mistakes  
Allegations of mere accounting errors are generally viewed as 
providing no evidence of scienter or recklessness by the external 
auditor. But what if those errors were really large? A fifty dollar error 
is one thing;83 a fifty million dollar error is arguably something else 
entirely. But in any given case it is likely unclear ahead of time 
whether a court will decide that a large accounting error provides 
circumstantial evidence of scienter or not. Many courts hold that even 
large errors provide evidence of negligence, not of scienter.84 The 
Seventh Circuit said in DiLeo v. Ernst & Young that “[f]our billion 
dollars is a big number, but even a large column of big numbers need 
not add up to fraud.”85 But other courts have held that a sufficiently 
large error can indeed provide evidence of at least recklessness.86 
 
are not sufficient to state a securities fraud claim.” (quoting Chill v. 
Gen. Elec. Co., 101 F.3d 263, 270 (2d Cir. 1996))). 
82. Worlds of Wonder, 35 F.3d at 1426 (emphasis added) (quoting Malone 
v. Microdyne Corp., 26 F.3d 471, 479 (4th Cir. 1994)); see also 
Dannenberg v. Painewebber, Inc., (In re Software Toolworks, Inc. Sec. 
Litig.), 50 F.3d 615, 627 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting same language); 
Limited, Inc. v. McCrory Corp., 645 F. Supp. 1038, 1045 (S.D.N.Y. 
1986) (“An inference of fraud does not arise from the mere fact that an 
auditor ‘certified’ an inaccurate financial statement.”). 
83. It is unsurprising that courts find that small errors are evidence of 
negligence rather than of fraud. See, e.g., Lewis v. Straka, No. 05C1008, 
2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59054, at *8 (E.D. Wis. Aug. 13, 2007) (“The 
amount that was misreported was a very small amount; the most that 
can reasonably be inferred from the misreporting is mistake rather than 
fraud.”). 
84. See, e.g., id. at *4 (“[L]arge losses do[ ] not create a strong inference of 
scienter.”). Huge errors do not indicate scienter or raise a strong 
inference of scienter under the PSLRA, some courts hold, because “no 
degree of negligence” can create rule 10b-5 liability. Reiger v. Price 
Waterhouse Coopers LLP, 117 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1014 (S.D. Cal. 2000). 
85. DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624, 627 (7th Cir. 1990). 
86. See, e.g., N.M. State Inv. Council v. Ernst & Young LLP, 641 F.3d 
1089, 1100 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that while “magnitude alone is not 
sufficient to support a finding of scienter, large GAAP and GAAS 
violations can play a role in finding scienter”); In re Spiegel, Inc. Sec. 
Litig., 382 F. Supp. 2d 989, 1020 (N.D. Ill. 2004) (finding a strong 
inference of scienter where defendants missed an understatement of $3 
billion in debt and an overstatement of $240 million in revenue because 
“[t]he more serious the error, the less believable are defendants’ protests 
that they were completely unaware of [the company’s] true financial 
status” (quoting Rehm v. Eagle Fin. Corp., 954 F. Supp. 1246, 1256 
(N.D. Ill. 1997))); Carley Capital Grp. v. Deloitte & Touche L.L.P., 27 
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A compromise approach is embodied in court opinions holding 
that the magnitude of a client’s fraud can support an inference of 
scienter regarding the external auditor, but only “when the plaintiff 
pleads specific and detailed facts showing that the magnitude either 
enhanced the suspiciousness of specifically identified transactions, or 
made the overall fraud glaringly conspicuous.”87  
b. Multiple GAAP and GAAS Errors  
There are disagreements regarding the evidentiary import of 
multiple errors as well as of large errors. Again, a single GAAP or 
GAAS error is one thing, but multiple errors might well constitute 
something else. In some cases, courts hold that multiple GAAP and 
GAAS violations are simply evidence of careless auditing.88 But again, 
there is confusion. In other cases multiple GAAP or GAAS errors 
have been deemed evidence of actionable recklessness.89 
c. Restatements 
Even when GAAP violations lead to a restatement of financial 
statements, most courts agree that while “subsequent restatement[s] 
do indeed provide some circumstantial evidence from which to infer 
 
F. Supp. 2d 1324, 1339–40 (N.D. Ga. 1998) (“While alleging a 
misapplication of [GAAP] standing alone is insufficient, such allegation 
when combined with a drastic overstatement of financial results can give 
rise to a strong inference of scienter. . . . [T]he totality and magnitude of 
the . . . accounting violations [may] constitute strong circumstantial 
evidence of reckless or conscious misbehavior.”); Rehm, 954 F. Supp. at 
1255–56 (“[T]hat defendants had to record a massive year-end increase 
of $5 million in credit loss reserves and slash its reported yearly earnings 
from $3.530 million to $325,000 weighs heavily in favor of a finding of 
reckless disregard.”). 
87. P. Schoenfeld Asset Mgmt. LLC v. Cendant Corp., 142 F. Supp. 2d 589, 
609 (D.N.J. 2001) (quoting Reiger, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 1013); see also In 
re Baan Co. Sec. Litig., 103 F. Supp. 2d 1, 21 (D.D.C. 2000) (noting 
that the magnitude of a GAAP error can play a role in a court’s 
inferring scienter); Reiger, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 1009 n.5 (relying on 
“boilerplate ‘red flags’” regarding “weak internal accounting controls” 
was not enough to infer scienter). 
88. See, e.g., Crosscil Inc. v. Gabriel Capital, L.P. (In re Merkin Sec. 
Litig.), 817 F. Supp. 2d 346, 358 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“GAAP or GAAS 
violations, standing alone, are insufficient to state a claim for relief 
against an accountant under the federal securities laws.”); In re Buca 
Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 05-1762 (DWF/AJB), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75224, 
at *46 (D. Minn., Oct. 16, 2006) (“GAAP violations, viewed collectively 
with Plaintiff’s allegations regarding the magnitude of the restatement 
and the alleged inadequate internal controls also are insufficient to give 
rise to a strong inference of scienter.”). 
89. See, e.g., In re Bear Stearns Cos. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 763 
F. Supp. 2d 423, 518 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (holding that multiple GAPP or 
GASS errors could not occur absent recklessness). 
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scienter, ‘GAAP violations without more, do not establish scienter.’”90 
But, yet again, other courts hold that a large restatement can provide 
circumstantial evidence of scienter.91 They are more likely to so hold 
when the accounting issue involved was simple,92 than when it was 
complex.93 And if the fraud was well hidden from the auditor by the 
client, even a massive restatement will not necessarily signal auditor 
scienter.94 
d. Auditor Access, Nonaudit Services, and Alumni 
Many courts conclude that the fact that an auditor had full access 
to and detailed knowledge of its clients’ affairs and records also fails 
to give rise to an inference of scienter.95 But if courts rely heavily on 
 
90. In re Cyberonics, Inc. Sec. Litig., 523 F. Supp. 2d 547, 553 (S.D. Tex. 
2007) (quoting Cent. Laborers’ Pension Fund v. Integrated Elec. Servs., 
497 F.3d 546, 552 (5th Cir. 2007)); see also In re Bio-Tech. Gen. Corp. 
Sec. Litig., No. 02-6048 (HAA), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81268, at *27–28 
(D.N.J., Oct. 26, 2006) (“While the restatement indicates that a mistake 
was made, that does not by itself show recklessness in the initial 
recordation”); Davis v. SPSS, Inc., 385 F. Supp. 2d 697, 719 (N.D. Ill. 
2005) (holding that restatements and other evidence of GAAP violations 
were merely evidence of errors, not of fraud).  
91. See, e.g., Lewis v. Straka, No. 05-C-1008, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76716, 
at *33 (E.D. Wis. Oct. 12, 2006) (“[A] large restatement may be circum-
stantial evidence of scienter.”); Spiegel, 382 F. Supp. 2d at 1035 (holding 
that allegations of ignored red flags are relevant in proving scienter).  
92. See, e.g., In re Microstrategy, Inc. Sec. Litig., 115 F. Supp. 2d 620, 652 
(E.D. Va. 2000) (noting that a “large restatement” that involved 
violation of “relatively straightforward accounting principles” 
constituted evidence of scienter by auditor). 
93. See, e.g., In re Acterna Corp. Sec. Litig., 378 F. Supp. 2d 561, 583 (D. 
Md. 2005) (holding that a large restatement is not evidence of auditor’s 
scienter where the accounting issue called for “complicated analysis”). 
94. See, e.g., In re Royal Ahold N.V. Sec. & Erisa Litig., 351 F. Supp. 2d 
334, 392 (D. Md. 2004) (“While this case does involve a massive 
financial restatement, this fact alone cannot establish scienter . . . .”); In 
re Livent, Inc. Sec. Litig., 78 F. Supp. 2d 194, 217 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (“It 
does not seem reasonable to infer recklessness on the part of an auditor 
solely from the magnitude of a fraud . . . .”). 
95. See, e.g., Reiger v. Price Waterhouse Coopers LLP, 117 F. Supp. 2d 
1003, 1009 (S.D. Cal. 2000) (“[A]n independent accountant’s 
relationship and acquired familiarity with its client does not impute the 
accountant with knowledge of every idiosyncratic detail associated with 
the client’s business.”); Queen Uno Ltd. v. Coeur D’Alene Mines Corp., 
2 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1360 (D. Colo. 1998) (“It is equally implausible to 
assert that because an accountant had access to a company’s internal 
data, it by implication was aware of any fraudulent scheme, no matter 
how far-reaching. Such a broad based rule would, as other courts have 
noted, subject any accountant or high-ranking company official to 
liability for even the most obscure allegation of fraud.”).  
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the fact that auditors have been fooled by clients or had information 
withheld by their clients to support a conclusion that there was a lack 
of scienter, as they often do,96 then it seems that complete access 
should militate in favor of a scienter finding, at least where there are 
sizable errors.97 
Similarly, plaintiffs sometimes allege that other ties between the 
auditor and client, including former employees of the auditor now 
employed by the client and the provision of nonaudit services, help 
establish scienter. But courts generally hold that the provision of 
nonaudit services for a client with a failed audit is evidence only of 
negligence.98 The Enron case appears to be an exception to this 
general rule, as it includes a detailed discussion of Andersen’s change 
in policies regarding both nonaudit services and waiting periods for 
employees to become employees of the audit client.99 While it is 
difficult to generalize from the Enron case due to its unique nature 
and the numerous alleged auditor improprieties, Congress notably 
restricted both nonaudit services to public audit clients and 
movement by employees of auditors and their clients in the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002.100 
A case concerning an audit firm alumnus that is emblematic of 
the difficulty in establishing scienter is AUSA Life Insurance Co. v. 
Ernst & Young, where the court found not only numerous GAAP 
 
96. See, e.g., Dimplex v. Scovill, Inc., No. 88 Civ. 7983 (LMM), 1993 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 11224, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 1993) (agreeing that 
auditor Deloitte was as much a victim of the fraud as were plaintiffs). 
97. See In re Spiegel, Inc. Sec. Litig., 382 F. Supp. 2d 989, 1036 (N.D. Ill. 
2004) (“Plaintiffs have alleged that KPMG personnel had extensive 
access to Spiegel and its financial records and failed to notice or react to 
substantial accounting problems at Spiegel which ultimately led to its 
bankruptcy.”). In In re WorldCom, Inc. Securities Litigation, 352 F. 
Supp. 2d 472, 499 (S.D.N.Y 2005), the court emphasized that Arthur 
Andersen had touted its approach as one where it understood in depth 
its clients’ business model and the court held that this made it difficult 
for Andersen to claim that it was not willfully blind to the host of 
accounting irregularities of its client WorldCom.  
98. See, e.g., Danis v. USN Commc’ns Inc., 121 F. Supp. 2d 1183, 1194 
(N.D. Ill. 2000) (“Even if this knowledge could be established, it would 
merely support an inference of negligence.”). 
99. See In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 235 F. Supp. 2d 
549, 677 (S.D. Tex. 2002) (“Andersen had to split its auditing and 
consulting practices, to ban current financial incentives that connected 
the auditors’ compensation to their sales of consulting services, to 
refrain from reporting internal audit work on audit clients, and to adopt 
a waiting period before Arthur Andersen partners could become 
employees of a client.”). 
100. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, §§ 201(a), 209, 116 
Stat. 745, 772, 775 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j-1, 7234 (2006)). 
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violations, but actual knowledge and acquiescence by the audit firm in 
the violations.101 The court found that Ernst & Young acquiesced in 
the fraud due to the “close personal relationship” between the Ernst 
& Young’s lead audit partner and the client’s chief executive, his 
former partner.102 Despite the findings of both actual knowledge of the 
fraud and the personal relationship as reason for the acquiescence, the 
court stated (without actually resolving the issue) that the scienter 
issue was “a close question.”103 The case was initially dismissed on loss 
causation grounds, but the Second Circuit reversed and also found the 
facts presented to be sufficient to establish scienter.104 But the fact 
that any judge could find the issue of scienter in such a case to be 
questionable exemplifies the inherent malleability of the standard.105 
e. Auditor Resistance to Client Practices 
When auditors call clients’ attention to improper auditing prac-
tices, sometimes courts view this as evidence that they are trying to 
do a good job and indicative of an absence of scienter, even if the 
auditors proceed to certify that the financial statements accord with 
GAAP.106 But in other cases courts have held that even threatening to 
issue a going concern opinion does not necessarily insulate an auditor 
from liability if the auditor has proceeded to certify the financial 
statements with knowledge of these issues,107 although it “cut[s] 
strongly in [the auditor’s] favor.”108  
 
101. See AUSA Life Ins. Co. v. Ernst & Young, 991 F. Supp. 234, 246 
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) (“[I]rregularities resulted in substantial overstatement 
of JWP’s income in each of the years 1988 through 1990, with E&Y’s 
knowledge and acquiescence. The annual no-default letters issued by 
E&Y were also false in that they certified that JWP’s books had been 
kept in accordance with GAAP, which E&Y knew was untrue.”), rev’d, 
206 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2000). 
102. Id. at 248. The court went on to state that “the record suggests that, in 
their confrontations with [the chief executive officer, the audit partner,] 
and his associates exhibited a level of tolerance and timidity 
inappropriate for an independent auditor. The ‘watch dog’ behaved 
more like a lap dog.” Id. 
103. Id. 
104. AUSA Life Ins. Co. v. Ernst & Young, 206 F.3d 202, 220 (2d Cir. 2000). 
105. Notably, the facts of the case were part of the motivation for revising auditor 
independence standards. See Revision of the Commission’s Auditor 
Independence Requirements, 65 Fed. Reg. 76008, 76031 n.262 (Dec. 5, 
2000) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 210, 240). 
106. See Maiden v. Merge Techs., No. 06-C-349, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84083, 
at *13 (E.D. Wis. Oct. 20, 2008) (“In fact, Merge admits that its former 
management circumvented accounting controls to execute the fraud.”). 
107. See, e.g., In re Spiegel, Inc. Sec. Litig., 382 F. Supp. 2d 989, 1037 (N.D. 
Ill. 2004) (“Nor is KPMG entitled to dismissal because it threatened to 
issue a going concern statement . . . .”); Drabkin v. Alexander Grant & 
 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 63·Issue 2·2012 
Scienter Pleading and Rule 10b-5 
471 
f. Rapid Discovery of Fraud by Third Parties 
When a third party such as a new CFO or a successor audit firm 
quickly discovers a fraud that the external auditor has overlooked for 
years, many courts find evidence supporting scienter.109 But other 
courts find this not to be especially persuasive evidence of scienter.110 
4. The Importance of Red Flags 
Today, no concept is more important to the scienter issue in 
auditor litigation than the red flag. Although a heightened pleading 
standard, such as the “no audit at all” test, often appears on its face 
to be nearly insurmountable, courts have held that “[a] complaint 
might reach this ‘no audit at all’ threshold by-alleging [sic] that the 
auditor disregarded specific ‘red flags’ that ‘would place a reasonable 
auditor on notice that the audited company was engaged in 
wrongdoing to the detriment of its investors.’”111 
 
Co., 905 F.2d 453, 455 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (“Issuing a going concern 
opinion may not insulate an accounting firm from liability . . . .”). 
108. Drabkin, 905 F.2d at 455. 
109. See, e.g., In re Bear Stearns Cos. Sec., Derivative, & ERISA Litig., 763 
F. Supp. 2d 423, 517 (S.D.N.Y 2011) (reporting that plaintiffs alleged 
that two parties discovered Bear Stearns’ financial statements’ 
overvaluation of assets and underestimation of risk exposure in a single 
weekend); In re New Century, 588 F. Supp. 2d 1206, 1231 (C.D. Cal. 
2008) (holding that the fact that a new CEO discovered accounting 
violations within months of taking the position provided evidence for an 
inference that KPMG’s audit had been deliberately reckless).  
110. See, e.g., PR Diamonds, Inc. v. Chandler, 364 F.3d 671, 695 (6th Cir. 
2004) (the fact that consultants quickly found internal control 
weaknesses is not necessarily evidence of recklessness); Puskala v. Koss 
Corp., 799 F. Supp. 2d 941, 951 (E.D. Wis. 2011) (“This means that he 
must have known that the company’s internal controls were completely 
unreliable, not just that he was negligent in failing to ensure that 
effective controls were in place.”). 
111. Bear Stearns, 763 F. Supp. 2d at 511 (quoting In re IMAX Sec. Litig., 
587 F. Supp. 2d 471, 483 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)); see also N.M. State Inv. 
Council v. Ernst & Young LLP, 641 F.3d 1089, 1102 (9th Cir. 2011) 
(“Considering the number, magnitude, and multi-year financial impacts of 
these grants, it is certainly reasonable to infer scienter just as strongly as 
an innocent inference.”); In re Suprema Specialties, Inc. Sec. Litig., 438 
F.3d 256, 279–80 (3d Cir. 2006) (“At the pleading stage, . . . allegations 
of GAAS violations, coupled with allegations that significant ‘red flags’ 
were ignored, can suffice to withstand a motion to dismiss.”); In re AOL 
Time Warner, Inc. Sec. & “ERISA” Litig., 381 F. Supp. 2d 192, 240 
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (“Allegations of ‘red flags,’ when coupled with 
allegations of GAAP and GAAS violations, are sufficient to support a 
strong inference of scienter.” (citing In re Complete Mgmt. Inc. Sec. 
Litig., 153 F. Supp. 2d 314, 334 (S.D.N.Y. 2001))); In re First Merchs. 
Acceptance Corp. Sec. Litig., No. 97 C 2715, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
17760, at *32–33 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 4, 1998) (“[T]he allegations in the 
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A reading of court opinions supports a hypothesis that when 
courts desire to dismiss a case, they often focus upon the “no audit at 
all” branch of the Price Waterhouse test, ignoring its other alterna-
tives (i.e., egregious refusal to see, no reasonable accountant, etc.).112 
And, in so doing, they are strict in how they define the notion of a 
red flag. Some cases hold that when auditors ignore red flags and 
uncritically accept their clients’ explanations on all accounting issues, 
their actions constitute “no audit at all.”113 Courts refuse to find 
“fraud by hindsight,”114 but if red flags are present at the time of the 
audit and the defendant auditors ignore them or investigate them 
 
complaint, including the magnitude of the misstatements, the specific 
GAAP and GAAS violations and the ‘red flags’ together support an 
inference that Deloitte’s audit ‘amounted to no audit at all or an 
egregious refusal to see the obvious or investigate the doubtful.’”); In re 
Leslie Fay Cos. Sec. Litig., 871 F. Supp. 686, 699 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) 
(“Because [the accountant] was immersed in [the company’s] operations 
while performing its audit, and because the ‘red flags’ would be clearly 
evident to any auditor performing its duties, one could reasonably 
conclude that [the accountant] must have noticed the ‘red flags,’ but 
deliberately chose to disregard them to avoid antagonizing [the 
company] and incidentally frustrating its fraudulent scheme.”). 
112. See, e.g., Thomas H. Lee Equity Fund V, L.P. v. Grant Thornton LLP (In 
re Refco Inc. Sec. Litig.), No. 07 Civ. 8663 (JSR), 2011 U.S. Dist. Lexis 
33554, at *39–40 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2011) (noting that the “no audit at 
all” cases “do not hold that the plaintiff must show that the auditor’s 
conduct amounted to no audit at all,” but that they may also show “an 
egregious refusal to see the obvious, or to investigate the doubtful, or that 
the accounting judgments which were made were such that no reasonable 
accountant would have made the same decisions if confronted with the 
same facts” (quoting In re Scottish Re Grp. Sec. Litig., 524 F. Supp. 2d 
370, 385 (S.D.N.Y. 2007))); SEC v. Price Waterhouse, 797 F. Supp. 1217, 
1240 (S.D.N.Y. 1992))); P. Schoenfeld Asset Mgmt. LLC v. Cendant Corp., 
142 F. Supp. 2d 589, 609 (D.N.J. 2001) (noting that although the court was 
not willing to hold that the defendant had done no more than a pretended 
audit, the number and magnitude of red flags could lead to a finding of “an 
egregious refusal to see the obvious or investigate the doubtful such that no 
reasonable accountant would have made the same decisions if confronted 
with the same facts”).  
113. Malack v. BDO Seidman, LLP (In re Am. Bus. Fin. Servs. Noteholders 
Litig.), No. 08-0784, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61450, at *12 (E.D. Pa. 
Aug. 11, 2008). 
114. Maiden v. Merge Techs., No. 06-C-349, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84083, at 
*13 (E.D. Wis. Oct. 20, 2008) (citing Higginbotham v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 
495 F.3d 753, 759–60 (7th Cir. 2007)); see also Higginbotham, 495 F.3d 
at 759–60 (“Hindsight is the only basis of the proposed inference—and, 
as the Court observed in Tellabs, citing a famous opinion by Judge 
Friendly, there is no ‘fraud by hindsight.’” (quoting Tellabs, Inc. v. 
Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 320 (2007))). 
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insufficiently, then plaintiffs may be held to be neither second 
guessing nor alleging fraud by hindsight.115 
In applying the red-flag approach to judging the adequacy of 
scienter pleading against auditors, courts tend to look for allegations 
of “‘in your face facts,’ that cry out ‘how could [defendant auditor] 
not have known that the financial statements were false.’”116 Because 
red flags must be viewed in context and as a part of the totality of 
the situation, it is perhaps painting with too broad a brush to subject 
to side-by-side comparison courts’ treatments of specific types of red 
flags. Nonetheless, to do so seems to provide further evidence of the 
confusion in the case law and the need for empirical examination. 
Red flags, say some courts, are the audit risks or “risk factors” that 
auditors are to consider under GAAS when performing an audit.117 As 
in other areas of scienter analysis, courts have considerable discretion in 
characterizing events as red flags and in drawing conclusions from 
them, which means that results are often inconsistent.118 
 
115. See, e.g., Bear Stearns, 763 F. Supp. 2d at 511 (requiring “sufficiently 
identified red flags, that is, particular facts, the disregard of which 
establishes recklessness sufficient to establish scienter”); Malack, 2008 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61450, at *26 (denying defendant’s motion to dismiss 
based on “repeated decisions not to investigate multiple red flags”); 
Katz v. Image Innovations Holdings, 542 F. Supp. 2d 269, 275 (S.D.N.Y. 
2008) (“[R]ed flags . . . alerted or should have alerted GGK, absent 
recklessness, to the fictitious sales.”).  
116. N.M. State Inv. Council, 641 F.3d at 1103 (quoting In re Oxford Health 
Plans, Sec. Litig., 51 F. Supp. 2d 290, 294 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)). 
117. See, e.g., McCurdy v. SEC, 396 F.3d 1258, 1261 (D.C. Cir. 2005) 
(discussing factors that are “red flags”); Bear Stearns, 763 F. Supp. 2d 
at 512 (“‘Red Flags,’ or audit risks, are the various ‘risk factors’ that 
auditors must consider under GAAS when performing an audit.” 
(quoting In re AOL Time Warner, Inc. Sec. & “ERISA” Litig., 381 F. 
Supp. 2d 192, 240 n.51 (S.D.N.Y. 2004))); In re Sunterra Corp. Sec. 
Litig., 199 F. Supp. 2d 1308, 1333 (M.D. Fla. 2002) (“‘Red flags’ are 
those facts which come to the attention of an auditor which would place 
a reasonable auditor on notice that the audited company was engaged in 
wrongdoing to the detriment of its investors.” (citing Van de Velde v. 
Coopers & Lybrand, 899 F. Supp. 731, 736 (D. Mass. 1995))). 
118. See Sanford P. Dumain, Class Action Suits, Auditor Liability, and the 
Effect of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, in 
Accountants’ Liability 205, 300 (A.L.I.-A.B.A. Course of Study ed., 
2006) (noting that district courts exercise considerable individual 
discretion in how they evaluate red flags, “often creating unpredictable 
and arguably inconsistent results”); see also In re Spear & Jackson Sec. 
Litig., 399 F. Supp. 2d 1350, 1363 (S.D. Fla. 2005) (noting 
inconsistencies among courts regarding types of events they view as red 
flags indicating evidence of fraud).  
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a. Generally Reliable Red Flags 
Whistleblowers. Apparently reliable tips from knowledgeable 
whistleblowers are usually treated as a red flag that cannot be ignored 
by auditors. In re Sunbeam Securities Litigation is a case where 
plaintiffs satisfied pleading requirements by pointing to numerous red 
flags, including not only GAAP and GAAS violations, but also 
allegations that the auditor failed to properly investigate internal 
controls, was tipped off by a Sunbeam employee regarding accounting 
improprieties, and ignored a press article alleging Sunbeam had 
manipulated the financial statements.119 In In re Lehman Bros. 
Securities & ERISA Litigation, the court threw out most claims for 
lack of red flags, but did allow one claim to proceed based on a 
Lehman insider telling auditor Ernst & Young (which then did 
nothing) that Lehman was using “Repo 105’s” (barely disguised loan 
transactions) to temporarily take $50 billion in debt off its books at 
the end of every quarter.120 
Resignation of previous auditor. Another red flag courts have 
naturally accorded weight is the mid-audit resignation of a previous 
external auditor, typically the defendant’s predecessor.121 
b. Not Necessarily Red Flags 
Most categories of potential red flags are treated inconsistently, 
sometimes viewed as red flags that should have put auditors on notice 
of fraud that they ignored at their peril and sometimes not. 
Knowledge of weak internal controls. An auditor’s knowledge of a 
client’s poor internal controls usually carries little weight with 
courts.122 Like simple allegations of departures from GAAP, these 
 
119. In re Sunbeam Sec. Litig., 89 F. Supp. 2d 1326, 1344–46 (S.D. Fla. 
1999). 
120. In re Lehman Bros. Sec. & ERISA Litig., 799 F. Supp. 2d 258 (S.D.N.Y. 
2011); see also Oppenheimer-Palmieri Fund v. Peat Marwick Main & 
Co. (In re Crazy Eddie Sec. Litig.), 812 F. Supp. 338, 344 (E.D.N.Y. 
1993) (ignoring an anonymous whistleblower’s tip was part of the 
evidence of scienter underlying securities fraud that was predicate to a 
RICO claim).  
When whistleblower complaints are adequately responded to, of 
course, evidence of scienter is eliminated. See Pirelli Armstrong Tire 
Corp. Retiree Med. Benefits Trust v. Raines, 534 F.3d 779, 790 (D.C. 
Cir. 2008) (director defendants insulated from liability where they 
reviewed and discussed the allegations made by a whistleblower). 
121. See Malack v. BDO Seidman, LLP (In re Am. Bus. Fin. Servs. 
Noteholders Litig.), Case No. 08-0784, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61450, at 
*9 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 11, 2008) (discussing implications of the resignation 
of a predecessor auditor). 
122. See, e.g., Ley v. Visteon Corp., 543 F.3d 801, 816 (6th Cir. 2008) 
(finding that knowledge of weak internal controls, even coupled with 
large GAAP errors, was not sufficient to establish scienter).  
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allegations may well be deemed “boilerplate allegations” of red 
flags.123 When accounting firms notice poor controls and extend their 
normal audit procedures in order to compensate, this action is 
obviously evidence that militates against a finding of scienter.124 On 
the other hand, some courts do hold that knowledge of weak controls 
can, in tandem with other facts, support a finding of scienter.125 
End of quarter transactions. Another seemingly obvious red flag is 
the presence of large end-of-quarter transactions.126 But not all courts 
agree. For instance, in DSAM Global Value Fund v. Altris Software, 
Inc., the plaintiff alleged that the client recorded as “start-up fees” 
two revenue transactions, one for $250,000 and the other for $338,220 
on the last day of the fiscal year, never previously having recorded a 
start-up fee exceeding $5,000.127 The plaintiffs also alleged that twelve 
other revenue transactions were questionable for a variety of reasons, 
including no signed agreement, no license fee specified, no payment 
required within twelve months, unexpired customer cancellation privi-
leges, and incomplete performance by the software firm.128 Despite these 
questionable transactions, the auditor issued a clean opinion. The client 
later admitted to GAAP violations and issued a restatement.129 Even 
assuming the claims were true, however, the court stated that a failure 
to investigate in such a situation “established only a negligent audit 
rather than scienter.”130 
Aggressive accounting practices. Some courts have found red flags 
where a client’s accounting practices were arguably in violation of 
 
123. See Reiger v. Price Waterhouse Coopers LLP, 117 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 
1009 n.5 (S.D. Cal. 2000) (referring to the fact that the audited 
company had weak internal controls as “boilerplate ‘red flags’”). 
124. See In re IKON Office Solutions, Inc., Sec. Litig., 277 F.3d 658, 672 (3d 
Cir. 2002) (refusing to infer scienter where defendant chose not to rely 
on its internal audit findings).  
125. See N.M. State Inv. Council v. Ernst & Young LLP, 641 F.3d 1089, 
1095 (9th Cir. 2011) (finding that, in tandem with many other factors, 
evidence of auditor’s knowledge of weak internal controls helped 
plaintiffs get over the scienter pleading bar).  
126. See, e.g., In re AOL Time Warner, Inc. Sec. & “ERISA” Litig., 381 F. 
Supp. 2d 192, 240 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (stating that “late-in-the-quarter 
revenue recognition has been found sufficient to support a claim of 
scienter”); In re Homestore.com, Inc. Sec. Litig., 252 F. Supp. 2d 1018, 
1044 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (“The most significant of these red flags was the 
fact that on numerous occasions, major transactions took place within 
the last few days of the quarter.”). 
127.  DSAM Global Value Fund v. Altris Software, Inc., 288 F.3d 385, 389 
(9th Cir. 2002).  
128.  Id. at 390. 
129. Id. at 389–90. 
130. Id. at 390. 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 63·Issue 2·2012 
Scienter Pleading and Rule 10b-5 
476 
GAAP or more aggressive than their competitors’ practices.131 But 
other courts have found this to be evidence only of negligence, unless 
the auditor was actively involved in advising the client regarding the 
overly aggressive accounting practices, in which case the courts are 
more likely to hold that the auditor was guilty of scienter for 
overlooking the aggressiveness.132 
Unusual accounting practices. When auditors find evidence of 
unusual accounting practices, sometimes courts view a failure to 
further investigate as mere negligence,133 but other times view it as a 
red flag that was ignored, signaling scienter.134 
Other sloppy auditing practices. Courts have held that “lack of 
evidential matter and numerous unsupported entries” were “red flags” 
indicative of fraud when the auditor ignored them.135 Contrariwise, 
other courts have held that failure to gather evidential matter and 
otherwise comply with GAAS did not necessarily constitute evidence 
of misconduct beyond simple negligence.136  
131. See In re Bear Stearns Cos. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 763 F. 
Supp. 2d 423, 512 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (holding that securities complaint 
alleging that violation of GAAP constituted reckless disregard of red 
flags was sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss); Malack v. BDO 
Seidman, LLP (In re Am. Bus. Fin. Servs. Noteholders Litig.), Case No. 
08-0784, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61450, at *11 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 11, 2008) 
(finding the defendant’s insistence on a material decrease in the discount 
rate to a rate lower than the bottom end of its peer range was one of 
several red flags that the court found significant). 
132. See, e.g., In re IMAX Sec. Litig., 587 F. Supp. 2d 471, 484–85 
(S.D.N.Y. 2008) (finding that auditor’s violation of GAAP not itself 
sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss, unless the auditor was 
extensively involved in the client’s process by which revenue recognition 
policy is developed). 
133. See, e.g., Dimplex v. Scovill, Inc., 88 Civ. 7983 (LMM), 1993 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 11224, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 1993) (holding that an auditor’s 
failure to pursue certain “‘smelly’ documents” and to follow up on 
“discrepancies and exceptions” was evidence of negligence only). 
134. See, e.g., In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 352 F. Supp. 2d 472, 498 
(S.D.N.Y. 2005) (stating that facts indicating wrongdoing by 
management constitute red flags). 
135. P. Schoenfeld Asset Mgmt. LLC v. Cendant Corp., 142 F. Supp. 2d 589, 
609 (D.N.J. 2001). 
136. See In re Crocs, Inc. Sec. Litig., 774 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1154 (D. Colo. 
2011) (finding allegations of failure to follow GAAS and secure adequate 
evidential material may constitute only negligence and emphasizing that 
plaintiffs did not allege that any Deloitte employee was present at any 
specific meeting in which the fraudulent scheme was discussed); 
Montalvo v. Tripos, Inc., No. 4:03CV995SNL, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
22753, at *19 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 30, 2005) (finding that allegations that 
GAAP and GAAS violations occurred only establish negligence where 
plaintiffs failed to identify “facts giving rise to deliberate intent or 
reckless conduct to defraud”). 
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This Part concludes that courts are deeply divided regarding the 
scienter standard to be applied in auditor cases, the acts that 
constitute circumstantial evidence of scienter, and the acts that do or 
do not raise red flags that potentially convert evidence of auditor 
carelessness into evidence of auditor scienter. Though these conclu-
sions are based on an extensive reading of the case law, they are 
scarcely complete or systematic. Therefore, Part II undertakes a 
rigorous empirical analysis designed to either confirm or contradict 
the initial conclusion that the case law is so malleable that it can 
support most conclusions in most cases, granting judges nearly 
complete discretion in ruling on motions to dismiss. 
II. An Emprical Analysis of Scienter Case Law  
Related to Auditor Defendants 
A. Introduction and Sample Description 
Previous empirical studies have generally supported the 
conclusion reached in Part I, that there is great uncertainty in the law 
regarding scienter pleading under rule 10b-5. Grundfest and 
Pritchard, in studying the early years of post-PSLRA pleading, found 
little predictability in court decisions: 
Judges can also value ambiguity to the extent that it allows 
them greater latitude to exercise discretion, more room within 
which to compromise with colleagues, and increased opportunity 
to avoid resolutions that they view as unjust or incorrect by 
whatever metric they might apply. Judge Posner, for example, 
suggests that judges often vote “their policy preferences and 
personal convictions,” within the confines of the “rules” of 
judging, as part of the judging “game.”137 
Does an empirical study of rule 10b-5 scienter cases involving 
auditors support or undermine this picture? To examine this issue, we 
collect data from securities class action complaints where the auditor 
is named. Our initial sample comes from the RiskMetrics Securities 
Class Actions Services database and includes cases naming auditors as 
defendants where the original case was filed between 1996 and 2005 
and the auditor portion of the case was resolved by December 2011. 
We utilize this time period because all cases are under the same legal 
framework under the PSLRA, and cases against auditors often take 
numerous years to resolve. We then match cases involving auditors to 
complaints from the Stanford Securities Class Action Clearinghouse. 
 
137. Joseph A. Grundfest & A.C. Pritchard, Statutes with Multiple 
Personality Disorders: The Value of Ambiguity in Statutory Design and 
Interpretation, 54 Stan. L. Rev. 627, 681 (2002) (quoting Richard A. 
Posner, Overcoming Law 131 (1995)). 
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In order to keep data collection manageable and to ensure that the 
defendant firms have reasonably similar resources, we limit our 
sample to cases against the Big 4 (formerly, Big 5 and Big 6) audit 
firms that involve claims under rule 10b-5. The sample includes a 
total of 144 cases involving the major audit firms. 
B. Variable Definitions 
Due to our limited sample size, we cannot code every possible 
allegation by plaintiffs and still maintain sufficient degrees of freedom 
to conduct analyses. We do, however, define numerous commonly 
used allegations and utilize common themes (Notice, Risk, and 
Independence) to group certain variables and define other variables 
individually.  
The Notice group variable includes allegations that the auditor 
was informed or had notice of the alleged fraud, from either the press 
(Press) or a firm employee (Employee), such as a whistleblower. The 
Risk group includes several variables that commonly imply that a 
client’s audit is higher risk than normal, including poor internal 
controls (Controls), financial distress (Distress), unusual or 
questionable transactions, particularly at the end of financial 
reporting periods (Transactions), and executive turnover (Turnover). 
The final group is Independence, which includes allegations that the 
auditor was “too close” to the client, including the provision of 
nonaudit services (NAS), the employment of alumni from the audit 
firm at the client, and allegations of unlimited or unusually high 
auditor access to the client (Access).138 
The individual variables are broken out separately for two 
reasons. First, the “Benchmark” variable, defined as the client firm 
displaying an unusual propensity to hit earnings or revenue bench-
marks or debt covenants, does not fit well within another group. 
Second, other individual variables may have implications beyond 
simply being a red flag. For instance, in addition to providing the 
auditor notice that the client may have an incentive to commit fraud, 
the “Offering” variable indicates that section 11 liability is likely also 
present.139 “SEC” and “Restatement” can be viewed as providing 
relatively “hard evidence” that something was wrong in the client’s 
financial statements.140 In particular, the Restatement variable 
 
138. Prior research finds that nonaudit service fees result in a higher 
probability of settlement. See Jaime J. Schmidt, Perceived Auditor 
Independence and Audit Litigation: The Role of Nonaudit Services Fees, 
87 Acct. Rev. 1033, 1055 (2012). 
139. Section 11 of the 1933 Act is, of course, a negligence-based liability 
provision. See 1933 Securities Act, § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2006). 
140. See Stephen J. Choi et al., The Screening Effect of the Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act, 6 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 35, 43 
(2009) (defining “prefiling hard evidence as a public announcement 
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provides an admission of an accounting misstatement, although courts 
generally hold that a restatement by itself is not indicative of 
scienter.141 “High audit fees” may provide evidence of scienter, but the 
inference behind this variable is substantially crowded due to its 
mechanical relation with litigation risk. A vast accounting literature 
finds that auditing firms price litigation risk into engagements.142 
Thus, relatively high audit fees could indicate not only the idea that 
the client “bought off” the auditor or that the auditor could not 
afford to lose the client but also that the auditor was aware of 
potential litigation risk. The “GAAS” variable indicates that the 
plaintiff alleges that the audit process itself was deficient. 
These variables are defined in detail in Table 1. Each variable is 
an indicator variable, equal to one if the definition is met, zero 
otherwise. The group heading variables are equal to one if any 
subvariable is equal to one, zero otherwise.143 Table 1 also contains 
the relative frequency with which each type of allegation appears in 
the sample.  
 
prior to the lawsuit filing of an accounting restatement . . . or an SEC 
investigation or enforcement action”). 
141. E.g., DSAM Global Value Fund v. Altris Software, Inc., 288 F.3d 385, 
390 (9th Cir. 2002). 
142. E.g., Dan A. Simunic & Michael T. Stein, The Impact of Litigation Risk 
on Audit Pricing: A Review of the Economics and the Evidence, 15 
Auditing: J. Prac. & Theory 119, 126 (Supp. 1996) (summarizing 
that empirical evidence shows U.S. audit fees increase with higher 
litigation risk). 
143. Note that the “Group” percentage will not necessarily be the sum of the 
specific allegation percentages because many complaints make multiple 
allegations in the same area. 
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Table 1: Variable Definitions 
Variables Definition Case % 
Notice  38.2% 
Press A press story questioned client accounting practices. 29.2% 
Employee A client firm employee told the auditor about fraud or questionable accounting practices. 15.3% 
Risk  88.2% 
Controls Internal controls were deficient or inadequate. 69.4% 
Distress The client was in financial distress or filed for bankruptcy. 38.2% 
Transactions 
Questionable, complex, or unusual client 
transactions should have alerted the auditor of 
suspicious activity. 
70.1% 
Turnover A high-level executive left the firm or was fired. 38.2% 
Independence  59.0% 
NAS Nonaudit service (NAS) fees made the client very important to the audit firm. 36.8% 
Alumni 
Alumni of the audit firm are in prominent 
positions at the client, particularly in financial 
reporting. 
15.3% 
Access The auditor had “unlimited” (or similar word) access to the client’s books and operations. 47.9% 
Benchmark 
 
The firm had unusual consistency meeting 
earnings or revenue benchmarks (year-to-year 
growth, analyst forecasts, etc.) or managed 
earnings to avoid missing debt covenants. 
82.6% 
Offering The client had an equity offering, debt offering, 
or engaged in a merger or acquisition during the 
class period. 
79.9% 
SEC The SEC investigated the firm’s accounting 
practices. 
30.6% 
Restatement Financial statements from the alleged fraud 
period were later restated. 
65.3% 
High audit fees Large audit fees made the client very important 
to the audit firm. 
34.7% 
GAAS Violations of generally accepted auditing 
standards (GAAS) occurred during the audit. 
70.1% 
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C. Univariate Correlations 
Table 2: Pearson Correlation Matrix 
 
M
er
it
 
N
ot
ic
e 
R
is
k 
In
de
pe
nd
en
ce
 
B
en
ch
m
ar
k 
O
ff
er
in
g 
SE
C
 
R
es
ta
te
m
en
t 
H
ig
h 
A
ud
it
 F
ee
 
G
A
A
S 
Settle   0.35 -0.04  0.00 -0.02  0.17 -0.06  0.15  0.26  0.23 -0.11 
Merit    0.21  0.14  0.28  0.04 -0.06  0.32  0.28  0.24  0.04 
Notice      0.29  0.28  0.10 -0.03  0.19  0.09  0.24  0.33 
Risk        0.40  0.12 -0.02  0.15  0.09  0.27  0.47 
Independence          0.03 -0.03  0.34  0.25  0.61  0.72 
Benchmark            0.27 -0.01 -0.03  0.10 -0.06 
Offering             -0.04  0.00 -0.11 -0.06 
SEC                0.29  0.43  0.27 
Restatement                  0.29  0.10 
High Audit Fee 
 
                   0.48 
 
 
Table 2 contains univariate (Pearson) correlations between the 
primary independent variables (as defined above) and two outcome 
variables. The first outcome variable is “Settle,” indicating the case 
survived the motion to dismiss. The second outcome variable is 
“Merit,” indicating the auditor settled the case for at least $5 million, 
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the approximate cost of taking an average case to trial.144 On a 
univariate basis, 118 (81.9%) of the cases survive the motion to 
dismiss and settle (Settle), while only 52 (36.1%) of the cases reach a 
settlement of at least $5 million (Merit). Prior studies use similar 
definitions of meritorious outcomes with respect to the primary 
defendants in securities class actions.145 
The correlations in Table 2 reveal several interesting patterns. 
First, even on a univariate basis, the Settle variable is uncorrelated 
with many of the most common plaintiff allegations: Notice, Risk, 
Independence, Offering, and GAAS. The only independent variables 
significantly (at the 10% level, as noted by bold type) correlated with 
Settle are Benchmark, SEC, Restatement, and High Audit Fee. 
Second, the Merit variable is significantly correlated with more 
variables, indicating that settlement negotiations may take into 
account factors that do not appear to influence courts. While the 
Benchmark variable loses significance, the Notice and Risk variables 
become significant when correlated with Merit. 
Among the independent variables, the correlations are as one 
would expect. For instance, SEC and Restatement are highly 
correlated (0.29), and all of the variables that relate to the auditor’s 
conduct (Independence, High Audit Fee and GAAS) are highly 
correlated.  
D. Multivariate Analysis 
We now move to a multivariate setting to investigate which 
factors are most relevant to the court’s decision. We utilize logistic 
regression because we have a binary dependent variable. Our first 
model is as follows: 
 (1) 
“Settle” is a dichotomous variable that is set to one if a lawsuit 
withstands the motion to dismiss, and to zero otherwise. F is the 
 
144. The audit firms disclosed that they spent an average of approximately 
$3.5 million defending a rule 10b-5 securities class action case in 1991 
dollars. J. Michael Cook et al., The Liability Crisis in the United States: 
Impact on the Accounting Profession, J. Acct., Nov. 1992, at 19, 20. 
Adjusted for inflation, this is equivalent to roughly $5 million per case 
over our sample period. 
145. E.g., Marilyn F. Johnson et al., Do the Merits Matter More? The 
Impact of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 23 J.L. Econ. 
& Org. 627, 646 (2007) (defining “‘nuisance’ settlements” as less than 
0.5% of the firm’s market value ten days before the end of the class 
period).  
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cumulative distribution function of the logistic distribution, and other 
variables are as defined above.  
Model (2) is identical to model (1), but the dependent variable is 
“Merit,” which is set to one when the auditor settles for at least $5 
million, zero otherwise. This model is provided to provide 
corroborating evidence regarding whether the factors that the court 
takes into account also affect the settlement negotiation. The second 
model is as follows: 
 
(2)
 
Models (3) and (4) are very similar to models (1) and (2), 
respectively, but break the Notice, Risk, and Independence variables 
into their sub-components. Models (3) and (4) are as follows: 
 
(3)
 
(4) 
Table 3 presents results from estimating these regressions: 
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Table 3: Logistic Regression Results 
Panel A: Regressions utilizing group variables 
Dependent  
Variable 
Model (1) Model (2) 
Settle t-stat Merit t-stat 
Intercept   1.30 1.34  -2.32** 2.49 
Notice  -0.33 0.62   0.84* 1.94 
Risk   0.38 0.44   1.03 1.29 
Independence  -0.79 1.20  -1.19* 1.67 
Benchmark   1.15* 1.85   0.08 0.14 
Offering  -1.12 1.45  -0.14 0.26 
SEC   0.51 0.75   1.11** 2.47 
Restatement   1.39** 2.56   1.11** 2.32 
High Audit Fee   1.75** 2.38   1.00* 1.76 
GAAS  -1.09 1.40  -0.44 0.64 
n 144  144  
Pseudo R2  0.295   0.272  
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the  
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, in two-tailed tests 
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Panel B: Regressions utilizing all individual variables 
Dependent  
Variable 
Model (3) Model (4) 
Settle t-stat Merit t-stat 
Intercept   1.41 1.48 -1.96** 2.27 
Press   0.20 0.33  1.20** 2.43 
Employee  -0.42 0.56  0.16 0.27 
Controls   0.03 0.05  0.81 1.45 
Distress   0.29 0.50  0.20 0.43 
Transactions  -0.33 0.49 -0.45 0.74 
Turnover  -0.19 0.29  0.76* 1.65 
NAS  -0.66 0.85  0.11 0.18 
Alumni   1.26 1.10 -0.01 0.02 
Access  -0.78 1.08 -1.35** 2.03 
Benchmark   1.28* 1.85  0.29 0.48 
Offering  -1.10 1.42 -0.21 0.38 
SEC   0.37 0.52  1.09** 2.20 
Restatement   1.35** 2.30  0.85* 1.72 
High Audit Fee   2.16** 2.48  1.04 1.47 
GAAS  -0.96 1.16 -0.71 0.97 
n 144  144  
Pseudo R2  0.318   0.356  
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the  
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, in two-tailed tests 
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Models (1) and (3) produce consistent results, with only 
Benchmark, Restatement, and High Audit Fee being significant. 
Thus, courts do not appear to be influenced by most of the allegations 
in plaintiffs’ complaints, and in particular there is little consistency in 
the treatment of red flags. Courts specifically state that restatements, 
without accompanying red flags, are not indicative of fraud.146 High 
Audit Fee is also consistent with increased litigation risk being 
correlated with auditors being sued,147 which is not particularly 
surprising. Thus, Benchmark is the only variable that could be 
interpreted as a red flag that is significant.  
When examining which cases reach settlements that likely reflect 
a meritorious underlying case, the results from estimating models (2) 
and (4) suggest that other factors also play a role. For instance, in 
model (2), Notice and SEC are also significant. The results from 
estimating model (4) suggest that reports in the press (Press) are 
driving the relationship between Notice and Merit. The statistical 
significance of SEC and Notice/Press seem reasonable with respect to 
the meritorious outcome of cases. The fact that these are significant 
in reaching a material settlement, but not in the dismissal decisions of 
courts, lends some support to the view that court decisions are not 
systematic. 
Similar to earlier results, Restatement remains significant in all 
specifications, although High Audit Fee is significant only in model 
(2). Interestingly, Independence is marginally significant in model (2), 
and the results from model (4) suggest that this is driven by a 
significantly negative relation between Access and Merit. While this 
relation is difficult to explain logically, it could be that cases where 
the plaintiff makes allegations consistent with the Access variable are 
relatively weaker and do not present other facts consistent with fraud. 
E. Sensitivity Analysis 
It is of course possible that other factors affect case outcomes. For 
instance, professors Pritchard and Sale examined how case outcomes 
in securities class actions against the primary defendants vary by 
circuit, focusing on the Second and Ninth Circuits where the highest 
numbers of cases are filed.148 Again, our relatively small sample size 
does not lend itself to this type of within-circuit analysis as even the 
Second Circuit (29 cases) and Ninth Circuit (24 cases) have relatively 
few cases. However, we do examine whether the circuit in which the 
 
146. E.g., DSAM Global Value Fund v. Altris Software, Inc., 288 F.3d 385, 
390 (9th Cir. 2002). 
147. See, e.g., Simunic & Stein, supra note 142, at 126 (summarizing that 
empirical evidence shows that U.S. audit fees increase with higher 
litigation risk). 
148. Pritchard & Sale, supra note 4.  
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case is filed could affect the motion to dismiss decision by including 
indicator variables for the three circuits with at least 15 cases (in 
addition to the Second and Ninth, the Eleventh Circuit has a 
relatively high filing rate with 15 cases). None of these circuit 
indicator variables is significant, and the coefficients on other 
variables are not significantly affected. 
In addition, as noted above, the Offering variable could be an 
imperfect proxy for section 11 liability. We code a separate indicator 
variable for whether a case has a section 11 claim, and reexamine the 
outcome of the motion to dismiss decision. We include this variable in 
lieu of the Offering variable. We find that this variable is marginally 
significant (p = 0.087) in the equivalent of model (1), but marginally 
insignificant in the equivalent of model (3) (p = 0.120). 
III. Implications 
Part I’s reading of numerous cases pursuant to a doctrinal analysis 
indicates that the courts largely agree that auditor defendants in rule 
10b-5 cases should receive special protection in the form of higher 
pleading standards, but it also reveals that there is substantial court 
disagreement regarding what form that special protection should take, 
what facts provide circumstantial support for a claim of auditor 
scienter, and what facts might constitute red flags indicating that 
auditors who ignored them were more than merely negligent. These 
conclusions are reaffirmed by Part II’s empirical conclusions that few 
factors are consistently viewed by the courts as indicative (or not) of 
auditor scienter. What are the practical implications of these findings? 
A. Uncertainty 
The uncertainty of rule 10b-5 pleading doctrine and its 
application has greatly bothered auditors. Part of their complaint is 
overblown. Whether or not judges view these actions such as ignoring 
red flags as indicative of scienter, these actions certainly indicate 
unsound (even if only negligent) auditing practices. Auditors are not 
saying: “We thought it was okay to do these things.” What they are 
saying is: “We know we shouldn’t do these things, but we would like 
to be more certain about the adverse consequences of doing things we 
know we shouldn’t.” This is a legitimate complaint, but not a terribly 
sympathetic one.149 
 
149. Auditors also complain that potential damages turn “on factors outside 
the auditor’s control.” Ctr. for Audit Quality, Reports of the 
Major Public Company Audit Firms to the Department of the 
Treasury Advisory Committee on the Auditing Profession 33 
(2008), available at http://www.thecaq.org/publicpolicy/data/TRData 
2008-01-23-FullReport.pdf. That is a bit of an overstatement, at least 
regarding the topic of this Article. If auditors perform good audits and 
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On the other hand, auditors are on firm ground when they 
complain that unpredictable scienter doctrine makes it very difficult for 
them to judge the settlement value of a case.150 And this is obviously a 
very significant concern as well for plaintiffs and, of course, plaintiffs’ 
attorneys. Plaintiffs’ attorneys, in particular, make very substantial 
economic investments when they file rule 10b-5 class action lawsuits,151 
and it is difficult for them to gauge the wisdom of such a filing when it 
is unclear how courts will treat the known scienter evidence. For both 
plaintiffs and defendants, the uncertainty of scienter pleading doctrine 
has decidedly unsatisfactory consequences. 
B. Judicial Discretion 
When applicable legal rules are in great dispute and their application 
in specific cases is unconstrained, as both the doctrinal and empirical 
portions of this Article indicate is the case for the rule 10b-5 scienter 
pleading standard, judges enjoy plentiful discretion in deciding whether 
to dispose of rule 10b-5 private suits for damages in their early stages. 
This might be a good thing. Hart and Sacks have noted regarding 
the general application of law that “[d]iscretion is a vehicle of good far 
more than of evil. It is the only means by which the intelligence and 
good will of a society can be brought to bear directly upon the 
solution of hitherto unsolved problems.”152 Arthur Miller has agreed: 
“I love judicial discretion. . . . We have to give [district judges] some 
elbow room objectively, individualistically, and contextually.”153  
 
do not make material mistakes, the excessive malleability of scienter 
pleading law is unlikely to cause them a significant problem. 
150. Audit firms are often “confronted with . . . lawsuit[s] in which [they] 
face[ ] an uncertain outcome at trial and potentially catastrophic liability 
if [they were to] lose[ ]. Settlement is therefore often viewed as the only 
sensible alternative, because no firm has the resources to take a case to 
trial when the downside risk is a multi-billion dollar or even a multi-
hundred million dollar, catastrophic judgment.” Id. at 35. 
151. For class action plaintiffs’ attorneys, the filing of a lawsuit is an 
investment decision, and typically a very expensive one. See John C. 
Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney: The Implications of 
Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and 
Derivative Actions, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 669, 684–90 (1986) (explaining 
that plaintiffs’ attorneys have more reason to be hesitant to invest in an 
action than their clients because attorney fee awards tend to decline as 
recovery size increases); Ronald A. Dabrowski, Note, Proportionate 
Liability in Rule 10b–5 Reckless Fraud Cases, 44 Duke L.J. 571, 590–91 
(1994) (“Plaintiff’s attorneys view securities class actions as high-risk-
high-reward investments”). 
152. Henry M. Hart, Jr. & Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: 
Basic Problems in the Making and Application of Law 158 
(William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994). 
153. Arthur Miller, Remarks at the Public Hearings of the Third Circuit Task 
Force on the Selection of Class Counsel (June 1, 2001), quoted in Richard 
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An extraordinarily subjective scienter test with lots of play in the 
joints allows trial judges who have a gut feeling that an overall claim 
is nonmeritorious to dispose of the case very early on, with a savings 
of resources to society, to defendants, and even to plaintiffs. Allowing 
such discretion could lead to superior resolutions of disputes.154 One 
may read a bevy of these opinions and conclude that few of them 
seem plainly erroneous on their face. That is a good sign. 
Of course, judges are lawyers, and it would be a poor lawyer who, 
given the opportunity to select from a range of pliable legal rules and 
to pick and choose among factual allegations, could not cobble 
together a reasonably persuasive argument for whichever choice he or 
she made. After analyzing what seemed to be a particularly ques-
tionable prodefendant decision by the Fourth Circuit in Public 
Employees’ Retirement Ass’n of Colorado v. Deloitte & Touche, 
LLP,155 Steinberg and Appel noted that the “no audit at all” standard 
“can be applied to shield virtually any decision requiring an auditor’s 
judgment or discretion in the performance of the audit, beyond purely 
technical accounting treatments.”156  
Still, if federal judges are honest, objective, and rational, granting 
them great discretion, as current scienter pleading law does, seems 
largely unobjectionable. But while few question federal judges’ 
subjective honesty, there are substantial grounds upon which to 
challenge their rationality and objectivity. 
 
L. Marcus, Slouching Toward Discretion, 78 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1561, 
1561 (2003); see also Robert G. Bone, Who Decides? A Critical Look at 
Procedural Discretion, 28 Cardozo L. Rev. 1961, 1964 (2007) (noting 
that discretion in case management is to some degree “inevitable and 
desirable,” but arguing for reducing that discretion); Marcus, supra, at 
1562 (noting that “discretion is an inescapable aspect of legal decision-
making” (citing Keith Hawkins, The Use of Legal Discretion: Perspectives 
from Law and Social Science, in The Uses of Discretion 11, 11–12 
(Keith Hawkins ed., 1992))). 
154. See Su, supra note 39, at 546 (“[T]here are benefits to giving judges some 
interpretive latitude. A determination of scienter sometimes requires judges 
to look beyond the facts to the nuances of the case. Proving the mental 
state of a defendant is already difficult; thus, by allowing judges to look 
holistically at all of the claims to get the bigger picture, they are able to 
come to a more equitable conclusion.” (footnote omitted)). 
155. Pub. Emps. Ret. Ass’n of Colo. v. Deloitte & Touche, LLP, 551 F.3d 
305 (4th Cir. 2009). 
156. Marc I. Steinberg & Dustin L. Appel, A Prolonged Slump for “Plaintiff-
Pitchers”: The Narrow “Strike Zone” for Securities Plaintiffs in the 
Fourth Circuit, 88 N.C. L. Rev. 1923, 1972–73 (2010). 
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1. Judges’ Bounded Rationality 
Although economists have traditionally modeled people as 
rational actors,157 this is only roughly accurate. Herbert Simon won a 
Nobel Prize in economics by establishing that people are rational, but 
only boundedly so.158 An important part of the new knowledge that 
undermines the rational actor model is the heuristics and biases 
literature created by Nobel Prize–winner Daniel Kahneman and Amos 
Tversky and their intellectual progeny. There is now a vast amount of 
research in this field establishing a large number of related (and 
sometimes overlapping) heuristics, biases, and other cognitive errors 
that ensure that people generally fall short of full rationality when 
they make decisions. 
Because judges are people, it makes sense to assume that they are 
subject to these forces. And, as empirical studies demonstrate, they are. 
Professors Guthrie and Rachlinski, along with Federal Magistrate 
Judge Andrew Wistrich found evidence that judges are subject to a 
range of heuristics, biases, and cognitive limitations, including 
anchoring and adjustment,159 framing,160 the representativeness heuris-
tic,161 the egocentric (overconfidence) bias,162 and the hindsight bias.163 
 
157. See Quintanilla, supra note 39, at 198–99 (“[O]ur legal intuitions are 
shaped by the assumption that humans are self-interested beings who 
behave as free moral agents and who make rational choices. Woven 
throughout our jurisprudence is the theory that humans are motivated 
to act out of self-interest and that every individual is rational and 
selfish.” (footnote omitted)). 
158. Robert Trivers recently wrote that the “alleged science called economics 
. . . has resolutely failed to ground itself in underlying knowledge, at a 
cost to all of us.” Robert Trivers, The Folly of Fools 8 (2011). 
159. People have a tendency to focus on an initial number or position, even if 
it is completely irrelevant to the decision to be made, and then to fail to 
adjust adequately in the face of new information. See Richard H. 
Thaler & Cass R. Sunstein, Nudge: Improving Decisions About 
Health, Wealth, and Happiness 23–24 (2008) (discussing the effect 
of anchoring on the decision making process). 
160. People often change their decisions in completely inconsistent ways 
depending upon how the question put to them is framed. See Jeffrey J. 
Rachlinski, Heuristics and Biases in the Courts: Ignorance or 
Adaptation?, 79 Or. L. Rev. 61, 99 (2000) (“Like anchoring, framing 
seems to lie beyond the ability of courts to identify, regardless of 
whether the issue involves a judge or a jury.”); Amos Tversky & Daniel 
Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice, 
211 Sci. 453, 453 (1981) (“Rational choice requires that the preference 
between options should not reverse with changes of frame. Because of 
imperfections of human perception and decision, however, changes of 
perspective often reverse the relative apparent size of objects and the 
relative desirability of options.”). 
161. The representativeness heuristic is “reliance on the degree of apparent 
similarity between the features of the events to the features of the 
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Hastie and Viscusi have also found evidence that judges are subject to 
the hindsight bias.164 And in a different study, Guthrie, Rachlinski, 
and Wistrich found that judges, like most everyone else, tend to jump 
to conclusions without adequate reflection.165 As these authors 
observed, “intuition is generally more likely than deliberation to lead 
judges astray.”166 What is the impact of judges’ bounded rationality 
when they are called upon to rule upon the allegations of scienter in 
rule 10b-5 cases? 
2. The Impact of Decisional Heuristics and Biases 
Different heuristics and biases in different contexts will nudge 
decision making in different directions. As it happens, most of the 
 
category in judging whether an event is a member of a particular 
category.” Rachlinski, supra note 160, at 82. It causes problems 
“because people tend to rely on the representativeness heuristic to the 
exclusion of other information relevant to categorical judgments,” such 
as base rate information. Id. at 83. Judges are subject to the 
representative heuristic. See id. at 101 (gathering evidence suggesting 
that judges often fall prey to the representativeness heuristic). 
162. The egocentric bias is another term for overconfidence; judges manifest 
it in various ways, including by being poorly calibrated regarding their 
chances of being overturned on appeal. Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the 
Judicial Mind, 86 Cornell L. Rev. 777, 814 (2001) [hereinafter 
Guthrie et al, Judicial Mind] ; see also Chris Guthrie et al., The 
“Hidden Judiciary”: An Empirical Examination of Executive Branch 
Justice, 58 Duke L.J. 1477, 1518–20 (2009) (finding substantial 
evidence of judges’ overconfidence in their judging abilities).  
163. The hindsight bias is the tendency to conclude that things that have 
happened were more foreseeable than they actually were. See Guthrie et 
al., Judicial Mind, supra note 162, at 784 (finding evidence of hindsight 
bias in an empirical study of judicial decision making); Jeffrey J. 
Rachlinski et al., Inside the Bankruptcy Judge’s Mind, 86 B.U. L. Rev. 
1227, 1229–30 (2006) (finding conflicting evidence on the extent of the 
hindsight bias). 
164. See Reid Hastie & W. Kip Viscusi, What Juries Can’t Do Well: The 
Jury’s Performance as a Risk Manager, 40 Ariz. L. Rev. 901, 917 
(1998) (finding “massive hindsight bias” by jurors and lesser but still 
substantial hindsight bias by judges).  
165. See Chris Guthrie et al., Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide 
Cases, 93 Cornell L. Rev. 1, 17, 27–28 (2007) (“[T]hese results 
suggest that judges tended to favor intuitive rather than deliberative 
faculties. . . . When awarding damages, assessing liability based on 
statistical evidence, and predicting outcomes on appeal, judges seemed 
inclined to make intuitive judgments.”).  
166. Id. at 5; see also id. at 29 (“[A]n excessive reliance on intuition will lead 
to erroneous judicial decisions.”); Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 160, 
at 1124 (arguing that intuitive thinking can “lead to severe and 
systematic errors”). 
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relevant heuristics and biases in the current context will probably 
benefit securities fraud defendants to the detriment of plaintiffs. 
a. Overconfidence  
People’s minds are “overconfidence machine[s].”167 In impossibly 
high percentages, most people believe that they are above-average 
drivers,168 above-average auditors,169 above-average eyewitnesses,170 
and pretty much above-average everything else. People chronically 
overestimate their own knowledge and ability to make accurate 
judgments.171 
To the extent that judges are affected by the overconfidence bias, 
and they are,172 granting them excessive discretion to dispose of cases 
at the pleading stage could be detrimental to a search for justice.173 It 
 
167. David Brooks, The Social Animal 218 (2011). 
168. See Risto Näätänen & Heikki Summala, Road-User Behavior 
and Traffic Accidents 237 (1976) (concluding that road users give 
safety concerns too little attention when considering high-risk driving 
behaviors); Caroline E. Preston & Stanley Harris, Psychology of Drivers 
in Traffic Accidents, 49 J. Applied Psychol. 284, 286 (1965) 
(discussing results of questionnaires where drivers with and without 
accident histories all rated themselves closer to expert than poor); Ola 
Svenson, Are We All Less Risky and More Skillful than Our Fellow 
Drivers? 47 ACTA Psychologica 143 (1981) (discussing driver bias 
in an experiment where drivers judged themselves safer and more skillful 
than the average driver). 
169. See Jane Kennedy & Mark E. Peecher, Judging Auditors’ Technical 
Knowledge, 35 J. Acct. Res. 279 (1997) (concluding from an empirical 
study that auditors are overconfident in their own abilities).  
170. See John S. Shaw, III & Kimberley A. McClure, Repeated Postevent 
Questioning Can Lead to Elevated Levels of Eyewitness Confidence, 20 
Law & Hum. Behav. 629, 650 (1996) (finding that overconfidence, but 
not accuracy, rises with repeated questioning). 
171. See Lyle A. Brenner et al., Overconfidence in Probability and Frequency 
Judgments: A Critical Examination, 65 Organizational Behav. & 
Hum. Decision Processes 212, 218 (1996) (reporting study finding 
overconfidence as well as poor use of base-rate information and 
vulnerability to representativeness heuristic). Will Rogers has been 
famously quoted as saying, “It’s not what we don’t know that gives us 
trouble. It’s what we know that ain’t so.” Hillel J. Einhorn, 
Overconfidence in Judgment, in 4 New Directions for 
Methodology of Social and Behavioral Science 1, 14 (Richard 
A. Shweder ed., 1980). 
172. See JoEllen Lind, The End of Trial on Damages? Intangible Losses and 
Comparability Review, 51 Buff. L. Rev. 251, 296 (2003) (explaining 
why “overconfidence may be a particular problem with federal appeals 
courts”).  
173. See Piero Calamandrei, Eulogy of Judges 21 (John Clarke Adams 
& C. Abbott Phillips, Jr. trans., 1942) (“I fear the judge who is too sure 
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will tend to cause judges to conclude that they can with some 
measure of prescience predict more accurately than is actually the 
case whether plaintiffs, if given the opportunity to engage in 
discovery, could find evidence supporting their scienter allegations.174 
b. Self-Serving Bias 
One of the most influential of the heuristics and biases is the self-
serving bias, the tendency people have to gather information, process 
information, and even remember information in such a manner as to 
advance their own self-interests or their own preexisting views.  
Top Enron executives were paid huge bonuses based on projected 
profits in deals they put together. Psychological studies show that 
they were prone to seek out information that would support the 
highest plausible valuations.175 This is called the confirmation bias,176 
and it accounts for people with conservative political views being 
more likely to watch Fox News while liberals are more likely to watch 
MSNBC.177 
The self-serving bias also affects how people process information. 
Thus, supporters of competing political candidates watching the same 
 
of himself, who reaches his decision quickly, jumping immediately to 
conclusions without deliberation or repentance.”). 
174. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Processing Pleadings and the Psychology of 
Prejudgment, 60 DePaul L. Rev. 413, 428 (2011) (“Overconfidence in 
judgment can lead judges to believe that they have more ability to 
predict the course of a lawsuit than is actually the case.”). 
175. See Robert Prentice, Enron: A Brief Behavioral Autopsy, 40 Am. Bus. 
L.J. 417, 419–21, 428 (2003) (discussing how the difficulty in valuing 
commodities and the incentive to set favorable prices led to a self-
serving bias and the acceptance of questionable valuations that 
contributed to higher earnings and bonuses at Enron) (citing Brian 
Cruver, Anatomy of Greed 80 (2002)). 
176. The confirmation bias is the tendency to seek out information that 
supports a hypothesis and to ignore or downplay conflicting information. 
See Mark W. Dirsmith et al., Of Paradigms and Metaphors in Auditing 
Thought, 2 Contemp. Acct. Res. 46, 56–57 (1985) (noting the 
irrational use of information by organizations (citing Henry Mintzberg 
et al., The Structure of “Unstructured” Decision Processes, 21 Admin. 
Sci. Q. 246 (1976))). This is particularly the case when the hypothesis 
is one already adopted by a person or that is consistent with the 
person’s self-interest. See Scott Plous, The Psychology of 
Judgment and Decision Making 231–34, 238–40 (1993) (finding 
extensive evidence of self-fulfilling prophesies and confirmation bias 
among both men and women in a variety of scenarios). 
177. See Drew Westen, The Political Brain, at xiv, 100 (2007) (noting 
that the pleasure centers of people’s brains light up when they find 
information supporting their preexisting beliefs); see also id. at 100 
(neuroimaging suggests that “our brains have a remarkable capacity to find 
their way toward convenient truths—even if they’re not all that true”). 
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debate each tend to conclude that “their guy” won.178 A study showed 
that when a group favoring capital punishment and a group against 
capital punishment were each shown the same document with 
arguments for and against capital punishment, members of both 
groups tended to construe the document as favoring their 
diametrically opposed positions and, indeed, felt more fervently about 
their point of view after reading the document than before.179 
The self-serving bias even affects how people remember 
information.180 Studies show people are more likely to recall evidence 
that supports their own point of view than evidence that opposes it.181 
Because of the self-serving bias, doctors who own stakes in testing 
labs order significantly more tests than doctors who do not.182 And 
studies show that even auditors—who are trained to be independent, 
analytical, and skeptical—are strongly affected by the self-serving 
bias.183 
 
178. See, e.g., Robert P. Vallone et al., The Hostile Media Phenomenon: 
Biased Perception and Perceptions of Media Bias in Coverage of the 
Beirut Massacre, 49 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 577 (1985) 
(showing that opposing groups on the political spectrum each thought 
that the media had been biased in favor of their opponent). And fans of 
opposing football teams who each watch a tape of the game are likely to 
think that the other team made the largest number of flagrantly 
inappropriate plays. See Albert H. Hastorf & Hadley Cantril, Case 
Report, They Saw a Game: A Case Study, 49 J. Abnormal & Soc. 
Psychol. 129, 131 (1954) (finding considerable bias among students in 
evaluations of opposing college football teams after a game between 
Dartmouth and Princeton). 
179. Westen, supra note 177, at 101. 
180. See Trivers, supra note 158, at 25 (noting how self-interest causes us 
to “continually create false personal narratives”). 
181. See Ziva Kunda, The Case for Motivated Reasoning, 108 Psychol. 
Bull. 480, 483 (1990) (discussing how people are subject to motivated 
reasoning, but cannot just believe anything, so under the “illusion of 
objectivity” they search their memories in a selective fashion to 
construct justifications for their desired conclusions). 
182. See Margaret Heffernan, Willful Blindness 185 (2011) (inter-
viewing physician David Ring, an orthopedic surgeon at a major 
American hospital, on the effects of money on the medical profession). 
183. See C. Bryan Cloyd & Brian C. Spilker, The Influence of Client 
Preferences on Tax Professionals’ Search for Judicial Precedents, 
Subsequent Judgments and Recommendations, 74 Acct. Rev. 299, 301 
(1999) (finding that after studying certain provided precedents, one-half 
of accountant subjects recommended a position known to be favored by 
their clients, even though a panel of experts concluded that there was 
only a 14% chance that the position would be sustained if litigated); 
Andrew D. Cuccia, Karl Hackenbrack & Mark W. Nelson, The Ability of 
Professional Standards to Mitigate Aggressive Reporting, 70 Acct. 
Rev. 227, 243–44 (1995) (finding self-serving bias in tax context); S. 
Salterio & L. Koonce, The Persuasiveness of Audit Evidence: The Case 
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The self-serving bias indicates that judges’ holdings will be 
influenced by their preexisting political and policy beliefs, and many 
empirical studies indicate that this is the case.184 Judges even 
 
of Accounting Policy Decisions, 22 Acct. Orgs. & Soc’y 573, 585 
(1997) (finding that if precedents all point in one direction, the auditor 
will go that way, but if precedents conflict auditors will tend strongly to 
favor client’s preferred position, and noting that the finding “does 
suggest that conflicting precedents provide the basis for the auditor to 
side with the client which, in turn, may give the appearance of a lack of 
independence”). 
184. See, e.g., Eileen Braman, Law, Politics & Perception: How 
Policy Preferences Influence Legal Reasoning 5 (2009) (noting 
the existence and lack of awareness of judicial bias when judges engage 
“in the ‘objective’ consideration of evidence”); Jeffrey A. Segal & 
Harold J. Spaeth, The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal 
Model 63 (1993) (finding that a judge’s own preferences and the 
influence of majoritarian impulses affect judicial decision making); Cass 
R. Sunstein et al., Are Judges Political?: An Empirical 
Analysis of the Federal Judiciary 45 (2006) (analyzing a large data 
set of judicial voting decisions and finding that “ideological voting is 
emphatically present”); Orley Ashenfelter et al., Politics and the 
Judiciary: The Influence of Judicial Background on Case Outcomes, 24 J. 
Legal Stud. 257 (1995) (studying influence of judges’ attitudes on civil 
rights cases); James J. Brudney et al., Judicial Hostility Toward Labor 
Unions? Applying the Social Background Model to a Celebrated Concern, 
60 Ohio St. L.J. 1675, 1761 (1999) (finding “numerous personal, 
political, and professional background factors” that affected judges’ 
decisions in cases involving unions); Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, 
Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing on 
the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 Yale L.J. 2155, 2175 (1998) 
(“Partisanship clearly affects how appellate courts review agency 
discretion.”); Tracey E. George, Developing a Positive Theory of 
Decisionmaking on U.S. Courts of Appeals, 58 Ohio St. L.J. 1635 
(1998) (finding ideological decision making on en banc circuit court 
panels); Deborah Jones Merritt & James J. Brudney, Stalking Secret Law: 
What Predicts Publication in the United States Courts of Appeals, 54 
Vand. L. Rev. 71 (2001) (reporting study finding that political 
affiliation helped predict votes in labor-management dispute dispositions); 
Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The Real World of Arbitrariness 
Review, 75 U. Chi. L. Rev. 761, 813 (2008) (finding significant 
differences between voting of Republican judges and Democratic judges); 
Richard E. Redding & N. Dickon Reppucci, Effects of Lawyers’ Socio-
Political Attitudes on Their Judgments of Social Science in Legal 
Decision Making, 23 Law & Hum. Behav. 31, 43–48 (1999) (analyzing 
effect of background on judicial bias in death penalty cases); Richard L. 
Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 Va. 
L. Rev. 1717, 1766 (1997) (finding empirical support for the theory that 
“D.C. Circuit judges employ a strategically ideological approach to 
judging”); Richard L. Revesz, Congressional Influence on Judicial 
Behavior? An Empirical Examination of Challenges to Agency Action in 
the D.C. Circuit, 76 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1100 (2001) (providing evidence 
linking political affiliation and ideological preferences of judges to judicial 
outcomes); David B. Spence & Paula Murray, The Law, Economics, and 
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misremember the facts of cases in ways that support their 
subconsciously endorsed racial stereotypes.185 
What this means for the current topic is that if judges are 
predisposed to believe that federal securities fraud lawsuits are often 
frivolous or that it would be irrational for auditors to audit recklessly, 
they will tend to unconsciously search through complaints and 
supporting documents for information that supports that point of 
view, to interpret the arguments and documents to support that point 
of view, and even to remember better the arguments and documents 
supporting that point as they write their opinions.186 And that is the 
leaning of most federal judges, who “routinely express concern that 
securities class actions are often lawyer-driven suits brought in the 
hope of settling for their nuisance value.”187 The more discretion 
judges have to dismiss cases early, the more likely they will do so. 
 
Politics of Federal Preemption Jurisprudence: A Quantitative Analysis, 87 
Calif. L. Rev. 1125, 1195 (1999) (finding in empirical study that 
decisions about federal preemption in environmental cases are the result of 
“actions of (partly) ideologically-motivated federal judges”).  
185. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect 
Trial Judges?, 84 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1195, 1232 (2009) (finding 
that judges “like the rest of us, possess implicit [racial] biases” but that 
they mostly managed to avoid their influence “when they were told of 
the defendant’s race” and actively guarded against their own 
prejudices). 
186. Judges may well suffer from the same phenomenon that affected Carne 
Ross, one of Prime Minister Tony Blair’s underlings as the Iraq War 
began. Ross later admitted: 
The speeches I drafted for the Security Council and my 
telegrams back to London were composed of facts filtered from 
the stacks of reports and intelligence that daily hit my desk. As 
I read these reports, facts and judgments that contradicted “our” 
version of events would almost literally fade into nothingness. 
Facts that reinforced our narrative would stand out to me 
almost as if highlighted, to be later deployed by me, my 
ambassador and my ministers like hand grenades in the 
diplomatic trench warfare. Details in otherwise complex reports 
would be extracted to be telegraphed back to London, where 
they would be inserted into ministerial briefings or press articles. 
A complicated picture was reduced to a selection of facts that 
became factoids, such as the suggestion that Hussein imported 
huge quantities of whisky or built a dozen palaces, validated by 
constant repetition: true, but not the whole truth. 
Carne Ross, War Stories, Fin. Times, Jan. 29–30, 2005, at 21, 22 
(emphasis added). 
187. Mitu Gulati et al., Fraud by Hindsight, 98 Nw. U. L. Rev. 773, 782 
(2004). 
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The increasing conservatism of the federal bench exacerbates this 
effect.188  
c. Hindsight Bias and Fraud-by-Hindsight Doctrine 
The hindsight bias is the tendency to regard things that have 
occurred as having been relatively predictable and obvious.189 Once 
people know of an outcome, they tend to systematically overestimate 
the likelihood that they could have anticipated that outcome in 
advance. The hindsight bias is exacerbated by the curse of knowledge 
effect (the difficulty people have in ignoring information that they 
have learned when they make decisions)190 and the outcome bias (the 
tendency people have to judge a decision’s quality by its outcome).191 
 
188. See, e.g., Matthew D. Bunker et al., Strict in Theory, But Feeble in 
Fact? First Amendment Strict Scrutiny and the Protection of Speech, 16 
Comm. L. & Pol’y 349, 378 (2011) (noting increasing conservatism of 
federal judges); Scott L. Cummings & Deborah L. Rhode, Public 
Interest Litigation: Insights from Theory and Practice, 36 Fordham 
Urb. L.J. 603, 607 (2009) (same). 
189. Baruch Fischhoff is one of the first to have studied the hindsight bias, 
which he described as follows:  
In hindsight, people consistently exaggerate what could have 
been anticipated in foresight. They not only tend to view what 
has happened as having been inevitable but also to view it as 
having appeared “relatively inevitable” before it happened. 
People believe that others should have been able to anticipate 
events much better than was actually the case. 
Baruch Fischhoff, For Those Condemned to Study the Past: Heuristics 
and Biases in Hindsight, in Judgment Under Uncertainty 335, 341 
(Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky eds., 1982); see also 
Baruch Fischhoff & Ruth Beyth, “I Knew It Would Happen” 
Remembered Probabilities of Once–Future Things, 13 Organizational 
Behav. & Hum. Performance 1, 3 (1975) (“[T]he remembered or 
reconstructed probability of an event will tend to be larger than the 
probability originally assigned to it if the event is believed to have 
occurred.”); Scott A. Hawkins & Reid Hastie, Hindsight: Biased 
Judgments of Past Events After the Outcomes Are Known, 107 
Psychol. Bull. 311, 323 (1990) (“[R]esearch and theory on hindsight 
phenomena suggest that the decision maker is unlikely to even be aware 
of the influence of the to-be-disregarded information, much less able to 
undo its effects.”). 
190. See, e.g., Jane Kennedy, Debiasing the Curse of Knowledge in Audit 
Judgment, 70 Acct. Rev. 249, 266–67 (1995) (finding significant curse 
of knowledge effects among auditors and testing methods of mitigating 
the effects). 
191. See Jonathan Baron & John C. Hershey, Outcome Bias in Decision 
Evaluation, 54 J. Personality & Soc. Pscyhol. 569, 570 (1988) 
(explaining that an outcome bias exists when “people take outcomes 
into account in a way that is irrelevant to the true quality of the 
decision”). 
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The hindsight bias is one of the most reliably replicated biases in 
existence,192 and there is little evidence that we can free judges or 
jurors from the effects of the bias simply by educating them regarding 
its existence and impact.193 Most people, including when they act as 
jurors, are subject to the hindsight bias.194 
In general, the hindsight bias “makes defendants appear more 
culpable than they really are.”195 If an auditor did not see something 
coming, but a judge pursuant to the hindsight bias concludes that he 
or she would have seen it coming and therefore that the auditor 
should have as well, the judge will be more likely to find recklessness 
where an innocent mistake occurred than if the hindsight bias did not 
exist.196 And there is evidence that auditor defendants may suffer at 
the hands of this bias.197 
But while the hindsight bias will disadvantage defendants if 
courts do not compensate for it, in the context of securities fraud class 
actions there is substantial empirical evidence that courts have 
compensated. In fact, they have overcompensated. In 1978, Judge 
Henry Friendly promulgated the “fraud by hindsight” (FBH) 
doctrine, ruling that a complaint that does nothing more than allege 
 
192. See Rachlinski, supra note 160, at 67 (“Every published empirical test 
of the hindsight bias replicates the phenomenon.”). 
193. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in 
Hindsight, 65 U. Chi. L. Rev. 571, 603 (1998) (“Psychologists have 
uncovered no way to instruct people on how to evaluate decisions in 
hindsight in a way that completely avoids the hindsight bias.”). 
194. See Lee J. Gilbertson, et al., A Study of Hindsight Bias: The Rodney 
King Case in Retrospect, 74 Psychol. Rep. 383, 383–84 (1994) 
(studying verdict in first Rodney King case); Hastie & Viscusi, supra 
note 164, at 917 (“[D]ecisions involving evaluations of risk, especially 
where the judgment requires the decision maker to infer ex ante risk 
estimates from an ex post perspective, the typical juror appears to be 
subject to a massive hindsight bias.”); see also Wray Herbert, On 
Second Thought: Outsmarting Your Mind’s Hard-Wired Habits 
47–48 (2010) (explaining the bias and giving examples). 
195. Rachlinski, supra note 193, at 572. 
196. See Donald C. Langevoort, Lecture, The Epistemology of Corporate-
Securities Lawyering: Beliefs, Biases and Organizational Behavior, 63 
Brook. L. Rev. 629, 662 (1997) (noting that the potential for 
hindsight bias in securities fraud cases is “severe”).  
197. See John C. Anderson et al., The Presence of Hindsight Bias in Peer 
and Judicial Evaluation in Public Accounting Litigation, 28 Tort & 
Ins. L.J. 461 (1993) (comparing hindsight bias in auditor cases to other 
settings); Marianne M. Jennings et al., Causality as an Influence on 
Hindsight Bias: An Empirical Examination of Judges’ Evaluation of 
Professional Audit Judgment, 21 J. Acct. & Pub. Pol’y. 143, 161 
(1998) (finding that the impact of hindsight bias on judges evaluating 
causation is stronger in some situations than in others). 
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fraud by hindsight will not pass muster.198 Judge Easterbrook then 
popularized the doctrine in DiLeo v. Ernst & Young199 in 1990, 
leading it to be cited in nearly one-third of all published rule 10b-5 
class action opinions200 and creating “a hurdle that plaintiffs in 
securities cases must overcome.”201 
In an impressive study, Gulati, Rachlinski, and Langevoort studied a 
large number of these cases. On the one hand, it might appear that the 
FBH doctrine is the courts’ way of neutralizing the prejudicial effects of 
the hindsight bias. But upon further contemplation, the authors 
suspected that it might actually be a means of disposing of cases quickly 
to manage dockets. They developed various markers and tested them 
empirically. All the evidence pointed to judges using the FBH doctrine to 
manage their dockets rather than to compensate for the adverse effects of 
the hindsight bias: 
[O]ur analysis reveals that the FBH doctrine is not an effort to 
control the influence of the hindsight bias in securities litigation, 
but is part of an effort to manage securities cases. Although case 
management can take many forms, from limiting discovery to 
facilitating settlement, in this context, judges are seeking to 
manage securities cases through a thinly disguised effort to 
screen securities cases at an early stage of the proceedings.202 
Part of the evidence of the prodefendant application of the FBH 
doctrine is that it is used almost exclusively in situations where the 
hindsight bias might benefit plaintiffs and almost never in situations 
where the bias might benefit defendants.203 In the study’s sample of 
cases, defendants won 70% of the time when the FBH was mentioned, 
versus only 47% of the time when it was not.204 The authors 
concluded: 
What is clear . . . is that judges are actively managing the entry 
and exit of cases at the pleading stage. In a sense, then, the 
PSLRA’s heightened pleading standards and the FBH doctrine 
are not just about raising the bar to entry into court, but also 
 
198. Denny v. Barber, 576 F.2d 465, 470 (2d Cir. 1978).  
199. DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624, 628 (7th Cir. 1990). 
200. Gulati et al., supra note 187, at 775. 
201. Id.  
202. Id. at 776–77 (footnote omitted).  
203. See id. at 777 (“[E]ven though the hindsight bias can benefit or harm a 
plaintiff’s case, judges selectively target the FBH doctrine at instances 
in which the doctrine benefits plaintiffs.”).  
204. See id. at 804 (noting that this difference was statistically significant). 
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about granting the judges more discretion in deciding who gains 
entry and who does not.205 
d. Fundamental Attribution Error and Motivated Exculpation 
If there is one overarching finding from psychological research 
over the past several decades, it is that the situational tends to 
dominate the dispositional.206 In other words, people’s decision making 
is heavily influenced by the context in which they make decisions. 
They don’t automatically make good decisions because they are good 
people or bad decisions because they are bad people. Rather, good 
people too often make bad decisions because of social or 
organizational pressures.207 
But most people are not aware of the influence of these contextual 
factors and tend to attribute others’ actions to their character, not to 
situational influences.208 “When observers draw inferences on the 
causes of another’s behavior, they systematically fail to take into 
account situational factors.”209 This is called the fundamental 
 
205. Id. at 822.  
206. See Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: 
Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 
Calif. L. Rev. 1051, 1103 (2000) (“[D]espite rational choice theory’s 
implicit prediction to the contrary, context matters in decision making.”); 
Lee Ross & Donna Shestowsky, Two Social Psychologists’ Reflections on 
Situationism and the Criminal Justice System, in Ideology, 
Psychology, and Law 612, 613 (Jon Hanson ed., 2012) (“[W]hen 
people are called upon to evaluate or predict the behavior of others, they 
tend to underestimate the impact of situational or environmental factors 
and to overestimate the impact of dispositional ones.”). 
207. See, e.g., Joseph L. Badaracco, Jr. & Allen P. Webb, Business Ethics: A 
View from the Trenches, 37 Cal. Mgmt. Rev. 8, 8 (1995) (finding 
that freshly-minted Harvard MBAs often felt “strong organizational 
pressures” to act unethically). 
208. For example, when people read an essay written by another person, they 
tend to attribute that position to the author even after being informed 
that the author was forced to take that position. See Edward E. Jones & 
Victor A. Harris, The Attribution of Attitudes, 3 J. Experimental 
Soc. Psychol. 1 (1967) (finding a tendency to attribute attitudes to 
behavior even in no-choice situations); see also Kenworthey Bilz & 
Janice Nadler, Law, Psychology, and Morality, in 50 Psychology of 
Learning and Motivation: Moral Judgment and Decision 
Making 101, 104 (Daniel M. Bartels et al. eds., 2009) (“[T]he cognitive 
processes of actors are opaque but their behavior is apparent, and so 
people assume that the obvious explanation (people behave the way 
they do because that is the kind of people they are) governs, and they 
shape their own behavior and beliefs accordingly.”). 
209. Quintanilla, supra note 39, at 222 (citing Lee Ross & Richard E. 
Nisbett, The Person and the Situation: Perspectives of Social 
Psychology 125–34 (1991)). 
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attribution error and it interacts with the hindsight bias to cause 
people to conclude not only that people should have made different 
judgments than they did but also that they made the wrong decision 
for bad reasons, not because situational factors impacted their 
decisions. Yet situational factors do tend to exert pervasive influence 
upon human decision making.210 
The fundamental attribution error is extremely persistent,211 and 
in the present context it can cause judges and jurors to conclude 
erroneously that a 10b-5 defendant acted with fraudulent intent.212 
How does this happen, even to intelligent and educated judges?213 
 
210. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Misfearing: A Reply, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 
1110, 1123 (2006) (book review) (“[S]ocial psychologists have shown that 
social influences often amplify cognitive errors.”).  
In contrast, when people judge their own behavior, they do not 
hesitate to take situational factors into account. See Hogarth, supra 
note 78, at 154 (“In other words, [we tend to believe that] personality 
drives the behavior of others, but situation drives our own.”). For that 
reason, people ascribe less variability to others’ behavior than to their 
own. See Plous, supra note 176, at 186–87 (citing studies). 
Another factor relevant to scienter is the tendency of people to judge 
the same behavior as more intentional and therefore more deserving of 
severe punishment when it will be performed in the future than when it 
has been performed in the past. See Zachary C. Burns et al., Predicting 
Premeditation: Future Behavior Is Seen as More Intentional than Past 
Behavior 3 (July 5, 2011), available at ssrn.com/abstract=1879558. 
211. See Plous, supra note 176, at 180–81 (describing studies where people 
not only attributed helping behavior to others’ religiosity, consistent 
with the fundamental attribution error, but continued to do so even 
after reading a study that found no such connection). 
212. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Rulemaking Versus Adjudication: A Psychological 
Perspective, 32 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 529, 545 (2005) (noting that the 
adjudicative process, by placing the individual front and center, 
arguably “induces courts to attribute too much blame to individuals and 
not enough to social forces”). Quintanilla lauds the Tellabs decision as 
helping to mitigate the fundamental attribution error by requiring 
judges and juries to compare and contrast culpable and nonculpable 
alternatives. See Quintanilla, supra note 39, at 209–10.  
213. One of the nation’s best minds and most prominent judges, Richard 
Posner of the Seventh Circuit, demonstrated the fundamental 
attribution error, as well as overconfidence, the self-serving bias, and 
arguably several other cognitive biases when he argued that the law-
and-economics movement was winnings hearts and minds because it was 
free of political biases, whereas competing theories were completely 
driven by political views. See Richard A. Posner, The Sociology of the 
Sociology of Law: A View from Economics, 2 Eur. J.L. & Econ. 265, 
274 (1995) (“Economic theory itself (including the application of the 
theory to law), at least when employed for positive rather than 
normative analysis, has no political variance.”). In other words, Posner 
concluded that people who agreed with him were right because they 
were not political whereas people who disagreed with him were wrong 
because they were political. While this argument is often heard on Fox 
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Quattrone noted that people have two judgment systems working at 
the same time when they make decisions. “System I” processes are 
spontaneous and intuitive. They are automatic and rely heavily upon 
heuristics, some of which are discussed in this paper. “System II” is 
more deliberative, requiring effort and concentration.214 This model 
was initially developed by Daniel Kahneman and Shane Frederick.215  
Quattrone developed a model of the mental processes behind the 
Fundamental Attribution Error based on the finding that people tend 
to spontaneously (using System I) attribute a connection between 
another’s dispositions and their behavior.216 To take another step and 
 
News and MSNBC, it does not deserve much credit, especially given 
studies showing that conservatives are more rigidly ideological than 
liberals. See John T. Jost et al., Exceptions that Prove the Rule—Using 
a Theory of Motivated Social Cognition to Account for Ideological 
Incongruities and Political Anomalies: Reply to Greenberg and Jonas 
(2003), 129 Psychol. Bull. 383, 390 (2003) (“[A]ll 13 studies provided 
at least some evidence for the rigidity-of-the-right hypothesis.”). 
Posner’s various versions of it have been strongly criticized. See Jon 
Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situation: An Introduction to the 
Situational Character, Critical Realism, Power Economics, and Deep 
Capture, 152 U. Pa. L. Rev. 129, 139 (2003) (“[M]any of the most 
prominent legal scholars actively reject the tenets of law and 
economics.”); Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situational Character: 
A Critical Realist Perspective on the Human Animal, 93 Geo. L.J. 1, 
79 (2004) (“Posner does more than just selectively reinterpret evidence 
to corroborate a favored theory. He also fundamentally adjusts the 
underlying theory, while falsely claiming that its pre-altered version has 
been confirmed.”). Empirical evidence and a little reflection make it 
obvious that the model “rational economic man” that lies at the heart of 
the law and economics movement is not an apolitical fact but an 
ideology. Barry Schwartz, Crowding Out Morality: How the Ideology of 
Self-Interest Can Be Self-Fulfilling, in Ideology, Psychology, and 
Law 160, 181 (Jon Hanson, ed. 2012) (“‘Rational economic man’ as a 
reflection of human nature is a fiction—an ideology.”). 
214. See Guthrie et al., supra note 165, at 7–9 (explaining that System I 
processes occur spontaneously and do not consume much attention, 
while System II processes involve complex thought that assesses the 
quality of such intuition). 
215. See Daniel Kahneman & Shane Frederick, Representativeness Revisited: 
Attribute Substitution in Intuitive Judgment, in Heuristics and 
Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment 49, 51–60 
(Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin & Daniel Kahneman eds., 2002) 
(adopting the labels of “System 1” and “System 2” for their dual-process 
theory of cognitive processes). For more detail on System I and System 
II thinking, see generally Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and 
Slow (2011) and Keith E. Stanovich, Who Is Rational? (1999). 
216. See George A. Quattrone, Overattribution and Unit Formation: When 
Behavior Engulfs the Person, 42 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 
593, 607 (1982) (finding this overattribution may “reflect a mixture of 
unit formation and insufficient adjustment”).  
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consider the situational factors surrounding the other’s decision is 
effortful,217 so System II may not kick in.218 Gilbert found that people 
“tend to draw [System I] dispositional inferences, even when they are 
informed that behavior is linked to situational factors.”219 
The Fundamental Attribution Error leads people to tend to 
conclude that because X did a bad thing, X must be a bad person. 
Having evidence only of the bad act, and tending to ignore situational 
factors that may have affected X’s decisions, people will tend to 
conclude that X’s bad acts are representative of X’s character. But 
when people believe that they know something about X’s character 
and are not relying solely upon X’s actions to draw inferences about 
X’s character, a different dynamic results that, interestingly, may in 
the present setting push judges in a prodefendant direction. 
Most courts presume that accountants would not do anything to 
endanger their reputations.220 The announced reason for this is a 
straightforward presumption of economic rationality—auditors’ reputa-
tions are the key to their prosperity and it would not be rational for 
them to recklessly aid their clients’ fraud and therefore undermine that 
reputation.221 As indicated elsewhere in this Article, there are pervasive 
reasons to doubt this theory. First, most people are at best boundedly 
rational, and that includes auditors.222 Second, there is sufficient 
empirical evidence of auditor misconduct to persuasively rebut this 
presumption as it applies to auditors of public companies specifically.223 
 
217. According to Fritz Heider, “behavior . . . engulf[s] the total field,” 
meaning that when we view others their behavior is the most salient 
thing we perceive, while situational factors tend to be in the 
background. Fritz Heider, The Psychology of Interpersonal 
Relations 54 (1958). 
218. Id. at 35, 53–54. 
219. Quintanilla, supra note 39, at 223 (citing Daniel T. Gilbert, Ordinary 
Personology, in 2 The Handbook of Social Psychology 89, 112 
(Daniel T. Gilbert et. al. eds., 4th ed. 1998)). 
220. See supra notes 66–68 and accompanying text. 
221. DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624, 629 (7th Cir. 1990). 
222. See supra notes 157–66 and accompanying text. 
223. See supra note 76 and accompanying text. See also Kahn & Lawson, 
supra note 67, at 404–05: 
[T]here are many reasons to doubt the extent to which auditors 
will always, or even often, find it in their own best interests to 
challenge management. First, the financial benefits of complicity 
with management, in the form of audit fees, future engagements, 
favorable recommendations, and the like, are tangible and 
concrete, while the costs in terms of lost reputation are remote, 
speculative, and uncertain . . . . Second, the incentives of the 
individual auditors reinforce the perverse incentives faced by 
their audit firms as a whole . . . . Third, auditors are subject to 
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It may be simple intellectual laziness that induces judges to 
continue this presumption in face of so much contrary evidence, but it 
is also quite possible that more is at work here. Whereas stereotypes 
of attorneys tend to paint them as slimy and immoral,224 stereotypes 
of accountants picture them, at worst, as boring and timid.225 Immoral 
and dishonest character is not a part of society’s default vision of 
accountants. Indeed, in recent movies accountants are most 
commonly portrayed as heroes.226 
To the extent that judges presume that accountants generally 
have good character, they will have a tendency to find that whatever 
bad acts they are associated with were not performed intentionally. 
Whereas the law formally holds that a defendant’s character should 
have little to do with any legal conclusions regarding motive, 
 
many of the same cognitive biases that plague all people, and 
many of those biases work in favor of complicity with 
management . . . . Fourth, and most importantly, it is hard to 
dispute the evidence of what actually happens. 
 
224. See Lawrence S. Krieger, Human Nature As a New Guiding Philosophy 
for Legal Education and the Profession, 47 Washburn L.J. 247, 267 
(2008) (noting the dishonest-lawyer stereotype); Maury Landsman & 
Steven P. McNeel, Moral Judgment of Law Students Across Three 
Years: Influences of Gender, Political Ideology and Interest in Altruistic 
Law Practice, 45 S. Tex. L. Rev. 891, 904 (2004) (referencing the 
“unethical lawyer” stereotype); Ruth E. Piller, Editorial, Professional 
Courtesy Does Not Refer to the Marine Kingdom, 40 Hous. Law., 
Sept.–Oct. 2002, at 10 (noting that “lawyers are often equated with 
flesh eating fish and used car salesmen”); Kenneth Ward, Alexander 
Bickel’s Theory of Judicial Review Reconsidered, 28 Ariz. St. L.J. 
893, 923 n.164 (1996) (noting “sleazy lawyer” stereotype); John 
Leubsdorf, Comment, Class Actions at the Cloverleaf, 39 Ariz. L. Rev. 
453, 456 (1997) (referring to the “greedy lawyer stereotype”). 
225. As the vocational guidance counselor said in Monty Python’s And 
Now for Something Completely Different (Columbia Pictures 
1971): “Our experts describe you as an appallingly dull fellow, 
unimaginative, timid, spineless, easily dominated, no sense of humor, 
tedious company, and irrepressibly drab and awful. And whereas in 
most professions these would be considerable drawbacks, in 
accountancy, they are a positive boon.” See also Howard Darmstadter, 
Explaining with Examples, 10 Scribes J. Legal Writing 137, 141 
(2005–2006) (noting that accountants are stereotyped as “dull, dry, 
meticulous bean counters”); Ian E. Scott, Note, Fair Value Accounting: 
Friend or Foe, 1 Wm. & Mary Bus. L. Rev. 489, 541 (2010) (noting 
that an accountant “is stereotypically rigid, rule-based, bookish, and has 
his calculator ready”). 
226. Tony Dimnik & Sandra Felton, Accountant Stereotypes in Movies 
Distributed in North America in the Twentieth Century, 31 Acct. Org. 
& Soc’y 129, 129 (2006) (“Characters with CPAs or CAs are more 
likely to be Heroes than any other stereotype.”). 
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intentionality, or ultimate blameworthiness,227 blaming is a social 
process and it is heavily influenced by psychological factors. 228 
In two recent articles,229 one with Mary-Hunter McDonnell, 
Professor Janice Nadler has reported a series of experiments 
indicating that judgments regarding moral character affect people’s 
attributions of motive and intentionality. In other words, if people 
believe that Joe is a bad person, they will believe that he is acting 
with more intentionality than if they see Joe perform the exact same 
acts in the exact same context but believe that he is a good person. 
In a series of three experiments they performed providing evidence 
of a process they call motivated inculpation, Nadler and McDonnell 
reported experiments producing 
evidence that when people judge a harmful action performed by 
a bad person or performed with a bad motive, they are more 
likely to perceive that person as more responsible, and the act 
as more causal and intentional, than when they judge an 
identical harmful action performed by a good person or 
performed with a good motive.230 
For current purposes, it is important to note that the process 
works both ways. In other words, there is also motivated exculpation. 
If people see a defendant as “good,” they are generally motivated to 
interpret the defendant’s wrongdoing as less intentional and less 
blameworthy.231 
In a second set of experiments, Nadler explored the mechanism 
behind motivated inculpation. Again, her experiments supported the 
conclusion that “psychological blame is influenced by perceptions of 
the actor’s overall virtue or lack thereof, even apart from the actor’s 
reason for acting in the specific instance.”232 At least part of the  
227. Fed. R. Evid. 404(a)(1) (“Evidence of a person’s character or character 
trait is not admissible to prove that on a particular occasion the person 
acted in accordance with the character or trait.”). 
228. See Charles Tilly, Credit and Blame 4 (2008) (“[C]rediting and 
blaming are fundamentally social acts.”). 
229. Janice Nadler, Blaming as a Social Process: The Influence of Character 
and Moral Emotion on Blame, 75 Law & Contemp. Probs. 1 (2012); 
Janice Nadler & Mary-Hunter McDonnell, Moral Character, Motive, and 
the Psychology of Blame, 97 Cornell L. Rev. 255, 273 (2012). 
230. Nadler & McDonnell, supra note 229, at 258 (emphasis added). 
231. Nadler and McDonnel’s three experiments demonstrated that people 
interpret certain transgressions as less legally blameworthy when they find 
the person responsible and likeable. Thus, in a hypothetical where a 
trailer fire killed two firefighters, a defendant who used the trailer to store 
fertilizer for his exotic orchids was found less blameworthy than one who 
used it to manufacture methamphetamines. Id. at 276, 283, 291.  
232. Nadler, supra note 229, at 2. 
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mechanism at work stems from moral emotions that people feel.233 
Nadler proposed that “compared to an otherwise virtuous person who 
causes harm, an otherwise bad person who causes harm makes us feel 
angrier and more disgusted, which in turn leads to more punitive 
attributions of blame.”234 Her experiments generally confirmed the 
supposition that when an actor’s character is thought to be good, 
people will judge him as having acted less intentionally in doing a bad 
act than when his character is perceived to be bad (and vice versa, of 
course).235 Overall, “[w]e give the benefit of the doubt to a person 
with a virtuous character who causes harm: we perceive his actions as 
less intentional and perhaps even less causal, and the harm less 
foreseeable than if his character is flawed.”236 
To the extent that courts irrationally credit auditors with being 
economically rational and buy into the common stereotype of account-
ants as boring but generally honest, they may have a tendency to 
underestimate the intentionality behind auditors’ acts that contribute to 
flawed audits. 
C. Exacerbating Judicial Bias 
The conflicting heuristics and biases mentioned above are most 
likely to favor defendants in the current context, given the strength of 
the self-serving bias, the vigor with which courts apply the FBH 
doctrine, the impact of moral exculpation, the current conservatism of 
the federal judiciary, and the foundational (and erroneous) operative 
 
233. See generally, Jonathan Haidt, The Happiness Hypothesis: Finding 
Modern Truth in Ancient Wisdom 20–22, 50–51, 54–55 (2006) 
(emotions play a significant role in guiding people to moral conclusions). 
Among the most important morality-tinged emotions are guilt, shame, 
anger, and disgust. Id.  
234. Nadler, supra note 229, at 4. Nadler cites work by Mark D. Alicke also 
supporting the view that people’s initial emotional reactions to a harm 
situation directly affect perceptions of harm and intent. See generally, 
Mark D. Alicke, Culpable Control and the Psychology of Blame, 126 
Psychol. Bull. 556, 557–558 (2000) (“[T]he culpable control model 
. . . emphasize[s] that personal control judgments and blame attributions 
are influenced by relatively unconscious, spontaneous evaluations of the 
mental, behavioral, and consequence elements”). 
235. Nadler’s experiment had participants read vignettes to assess the 
blameworthiness of “Nathan,” who accidentally kills another man in a 
skiing accident. Certain participants read about “good Nathan,” who 
was a responsible worker and volunteer, and others “bad Nathan,” who 
was an irresponsible worker. When Nathan’s moral character was “bad,” 
he was seen as having acted more intentionally and was thus more 
blameworthy than “good Nathan.” See Nadler, supra note 229, at 16–27 
(describing the design of the experiment and its results). The effect 
disappeared if study participants were asked to make judgments about 
both “good Nathan” and “bad Nathan” side by side. Id. at 25. 
236. Id. at 29 (emphasis added). 
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assumption that auditors would not sacrifice their reputations just to 
please a client and therefore deserve a special level of protection in 
10b-5 scienter pleading. Professor Bone has argued that given judges’ 
bounded rationality, it is not necessarily a good idea to give courts 
significant discretion.237 The key point to stress is not so much which 
side is favored by judges’ unconscious biases, but the fact that 
whatever prejudices are in play are exacerbated by both the structure 
of the decision making process and the vagueness of the law that we 
document. 
First, Rachlinski recently pointed out that the Supreme Court’s 
recent decisions in Twombly and Iqbal require judges to decide cases 
based largely upon their first impression of the lawsuit without 
knowing which facts discovery will uncover.238 This “encourages 
judges to rely too heavily on their intuition, elevates the importance 
of potentially misleading pleading practices, and encourages 
overconfidence among judges.”239 The PSLRA preceded Ashcroft and 
Twombly in encouraging judges to resolve rule 10b-5 cases before 
discovery, intensifying the impact of judges’ psychological biases and 
cognitive distortions. 
Second, the current muddled state of the law exacerbates 
whatever prejudices happen to apply whereas an ideal legal regime 
would instead minimize them. As Droske has pointed out, confusion 
or ambiguity in a doctrine increases the likelihood that the self-
serving bias and other behavioral and cognitive effects will lead to 
judges following their own preferences: 
The lack of clarity with respect to whether statutory language is 
ambiguous provides judges an opportunity to exercise discretion 
so as to maximize their own personal political preferences. 
Professors Frank B. Cross and Emerson H. Tiller documented 
this phenomenon in an essay that empirically showed that 
judges selectively employed the Chevron doctrine—only 
triggered in cases of statutory ambiguity—so that cases would 
come out in accord with their political preferences.240  
 
237. See Bone, supra note 153, at 2023 (“The naïve assumption that trial 
judges have the institutional expertise and experience to exercise 
discretion well ignores serious and unavoidable bounded rationality, 
information access, and strategic interaction obstacles that impair the 
quality of case-specific decision-making.”). 
238. See Rachlinski, supra note 174, at 413 (“The new pleading standard 
that the Court has articulated forces judges to rely on their first 
impressions of a lawsuit. Judges must imagine the course of the lawsuit 
without knowing what facts discovery will uncover.”). 
239. Id. at 414.  
240. Timothy J. Droske, Congressional Polarization Due to Maximizing 
Political Satisfaction: Why Elhauge’s Current Enactable Preferences 
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Legal indeterminacy fosters unfettered judicial discretion which, 
in turn, creates more likelihood for judgment error.241 Discretion has 
advantages, but should never be unconstrained.242 Decisionmakers are 
more likely to be influenced by factors that they themselves view as 
unjustifiable, when a situation is elastic and there is more wiggle room 
to choose an outcome.243 Judicial discretion, while absolutely 
necessary in some measure, also embodies the “right to be wrong.”244 
Conclusion 
Pleading rules are of central concern to securities antifraud 
litigation. “Determining who is allowed to invoke the machinery of 
the civil justice system, and under what circumstances they may do 
 
Default Rule Fails to Avoid the Congressional Deadlock and 
Polarization That Stems From Expansionist Statutory Interpretation, 
102 Nw. U. L. Rev. Colloquy 176, 185 (2008) (citing Cross & Tiller, 
supra note 184, at 2169). 
241. See Guthrie et al., supra note 165, at 24 (referencing the hindsight bias 
specifically); Chunlin Leonhard, A Legal Chameleon: An Examination of 
the Doctrine of Good Faith in Chinese and American Contract Law, 25 
Conn. J. Int’l L. 305, 311 (2010) (noting that legal vagueness invites 
broad judicial discretion); Mary Liston, Witnessing Arbitrariness: 
Roncarelli v. Duplessis Fifty Years On, 55 McGill L.J. 689, 713 
(2010) (“Legal indeterminacy, uncertainty, gaps, and vagueness 
exacerbate the risks of judicial discretion . . . .”); Francis Barry 
McCarthy, The Confused Constitutional Status and Meaning of Parental 
Rights, 22 Ga. L. Rev. 975, 1022 (1988) (noting that vague laws 
create the problem of extensive judicial discretion); Paul L. Smith, The 
Primary Caretaker Presumption: Have We Been Presuming Too Much?, 
75 Ind. L.J. 731, 742 (2000) (vague legal doctrine leads to “unfettered 
judicial discretion” (quoting Laura Sack, Women and Children First: A 
Feminist Analysis of the Primary Caretaker Standard in Child Custody 
Cases, 4 Yale J.L. & Feminism 291, 293 (1992))).  
242. See generally Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 31–39 
(1978) (noting that, while judicial discretion is useful when laws are 
vague or have not been established, there must be standards that 
determine when judicial discretion may overrule, alter, or establish rules 
of law). 
243. See Nadler & McDonnell, supra note 229, at 270 (“We are also 
influenced by factors that we ourselves regard as unjustifiable, though 
we may not be aware of such influence. This is especially true when the 
legitimate evidence is ‘elastic’—that is, when there is more wiggle room 
to come out either way in their conclusion.” (footnote omitted)). 
244. Maurice Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion of the Trial Court, Viewed from 
Above, 22 Syracuse L. Rev. 635, 637 (1971). And substantive 
discretion, which is what is at stake here, is more worrisome than 
procedural discretion. See Marcus, supra note 153, at 1605. 
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so, lies at the core of how a system of law defines itself.”245 
Extraordinarily high stakes are involved when rule 10b-5 class action 
litigation is filed, so it is important to get it right, and it appears that 
we are not getting it right. Part I of this Article contains a doctrinal 
analysis that indicates that both general rules of pleading scienter in 
auditor fraud cases and the practical application of those rules are 
hopelessly muddled. Part II confirmed this conclusion through 
empirical study, demonstrating with some rigor that neither plaintiffs 
nor defendants can predict with any certainty how courts will react to 
specific factual allegations of auditor scienter in any given case. This 
is unlikely to be a satisfactory state of affairs, and Part III used the 
insights of behavioral psychology and related fields to explain why 
significant doctrinal ambiguity tends to create excessive judicial 
discretion which, in turn, is a recipe for bias that can disadvantage 
both plaintiffs and defendants. In the current state of affairs, it seems 
more likely that plaintiffs will be disadvantaged, but whatever the 
direction of bias, unfettered discretion is likely to lead to more judicial 
errors of judgment than would occur under a regime of clearer and 
more settled law.246 
 
245. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Why Heightened Pleading—Why Now?, 114 Penn 
St. L. Rev. 1247, 1247 (2010). 
246. Spelling out such a clearer state of the law is a task beyond the scope of 
this Article, but others have tried, and their efforts deserve some 
consideration. See, e.g., Olazábal & Abril, supra note 3, at 440. 
  
 
   
